

CONCEPT OF UPAMĀNA

A CRITICAL STUDY

Thesis submitted to the
Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By
Mrs. Laijamma. P.N.

Govt. Sanskrit College
Tripunithura
December 2002

[Handwritten signature]

CERTIFICATE

Tripunithura

30th December, 2002.

Dr. T. ĀRYĀDEVI

Supervising Teacher,

Reader in Nyāya,

Srī Śankaracarya University of Sanskrit,
Kalady.

This is to certify that this thesis '**Concept of upamāna a critical study**' Submitted by Mrs. Laijamma. P.N. for the Ph.D degree of the Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam, is a record of bona fide research carried out by her under my supervision. It has not, either in part or as a whole, previously formed the basis for the award of any degree or diploma.

(Dr. T. ĀRYĀDEVI)

T. Arya Devi


Received by
Srī Śankaracarya University of Sanskrit,
Kalady.

DECLARATION

Tripunithura

30-12-2002.

I hereby declare that, this thesis '**Concept of upamāna a critical study**' has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship, fellowship or other similar title or recognition



Mrs. Laijamma. P.N.
Research Scholar,
Govt. Sanskrit College,
Tripunithura.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	i - ii
ABBREVIATIONS	iii
INTRODUCTION	1 - 3
CHAPTER I	
NYAYASASTRA AS A PRAMANASASTRA	5 - 39
THE DEFINITION OF PRAMANA	5 - 13
VARIETIES OF PRAMANA	13 - 15
THE CONCEPT OF PRAMANA	16 - 25
VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE	25 - 30
SVATAHPRAMANYA AND PARATAHPRAMANYA	30 - 35
ROLE OF PRAMANA IN NAVYA NYAYA	35 - 37
PRAMANA IN CARAKASMHITA	37 - 39
CHAPTER II	
FOUR MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IN	
NYAYA PHILOSOPHY	41 - 96
PERCEPTION	41 - 47
INTRIYARTHA SANNIKARSA	
(SENSE OBJECT CONTACT)	47 - 50
ARTHA OR OBJECT	50
MIND	51 - 54
THE CAUSES OF PRATYAKSAJNANA	55
SIX KINDS OF SENSE-OBJECT CONTACT	55 - 56

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA AND SAVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA	56 - 61
INFERENCE ANUMANA THE MAJOR SOURCE OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IN NYAYA PHILOSOPHY	62 - 65
VYAPTI	65 - 72
SVARTHANUMANA OR INFERENCE FOR ONESELF	73
PARARTHANUMANA OR INFERENCE FOR OTHERS	74 - 76
THE MEMBERS OF THE PARARTHANUMANA	76 - 80
UPAMANA OR COMPARISON	81
SABDA OR VERBAL TESTIMONY	81 - 87
SAKTI OR DENOTATIVE FUNCTION	87 - 91
CAUSE OF VERBAL COGNITION	91 - 94
LAKSANA OR IMPLICATION	95 - 96

CHAPTER III

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UPAMANA AND OTHER MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE	98 - 130
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRATYAKSHA AND UPAMITI	98 - 102
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANUMITI AND UPAMITI	103 - 123
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UPAMITI AND SABDABODHA	124 - 130

CHAPTER IV

THE DIFFERENCE OPINIONS OF OLD AND NEW

LOGICIANS IN THE PROCESS AND NATURE OF

UPAMITI

132 - 144

CHAPTER V

THE EFFECT OF UPAMANA

146 - 149

CHAPTER VI

THE NECESSITY OF ACCEPTING UPAMANA

AS A SEPERATE PRAMANA ACCORDING TO THE

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

149 - 167

UPAMANA

150 - 164

IMPORTANCE OF UPAMANA

164 - 167

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

168 - 174

PREFACE

Upamana is an independent means of knowledge in the systems of Nyaya, Purvamimamsa and the Advaita school of Uttaramimamsa. The Nyaya system regards the Pramanas as one of the important sources of knowledge. Among the four means of valid knowledge in Nyaya philosophy, upamana is regarded as the third means of valid knowledge. In Nyaya the word upamana is used in the sense of cause or karma. Prama is of four kinds and the Pramanas also are four. The Pramanas are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The pramas are pratyaksa, anumiti, upamiti and verbal comprehension. For making upamiti sadrsyajnana is the karma. By sadrsyajnana of an object we can perceive another unknown object. So this sadrsyajnana has an important place in every day life.

In the preparation of this thesis, I have received valuable guidance and immense help from my supervising teacher, Dr. T. Aryadevi. But for her abiding interest and continuous encouragement, it is doubtful whether the thesis could have been completed now. I cannot adequately express my deep sense of gratitude to her.

I am thankful to the Principal, Govt. Sanskrit College, Tripunithura and the authorities of the Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam for providing the necessary facilities for the conduct of my research work.

Laijamma. P.N.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. N.B ^h 4	- NYĀYABHĀSYA
2. T.B.	- TARKABHAṢA
3. M.M	- MANAMEYODAYA
4. C.S	- ĀCHARAKASAMHITA
5. N.M.	- NYĀYAMANJARY
6. T.S	- TARKASAMGRAHAM
7. HIL	- HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC
8. MU	- MUKTAVALI
9. N.N.S	- NYĀYASUTRA
10. N.V	- NYĀYAVARTIKA
11. N.V.T.T.	- NYĀYAVARTIKA TALPARYATĪKA
12. KU	- KUSUMANJALI
13. U.I.I.P	- UPAMĀNA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophy presents a variety of opinions regarding the means of cognition. Different schools recognize different number and kind of Pramaṇas. Goutama's Nyāyasūtra describes the real knowledge of the sixteen categories leads to the liberation. In Goutama's list of the categories Pramaṇa occupies the first and foremost position because of the importance and indispensability of Pramāṇa. Upamāna is the third means of valid knowledge in the system of Nyāya. Goutama's definition of upamāna is Prasiddhasadharmyāt sādhyā Sāadhanam upamānam". Vatsyāyana explains this definition of upamāna as which makes known what is to be made known from similarity with an object that is already will known. Naiyāyikas famous example of upamāna is 'as the cow so the gavaya'. The upholders of upamāna as an independent means of knowledge also differ in details. There is a difference of opinion regarding the nature of resultant knowledge through upamāna. The

purvamīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedantins are on one side and the naiyāyikas on the other. According to the purvamīmāṃsakas the resultant knowledge relates to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one. But according to the naiyāyikas it is the knowledge that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects.

Similarly, the other systems agree in rejecting upamāna as an independent means of cognition. Their grounds for doing so, however, are very different. Some include it under inference, some under perception while some others include it under remembrance. A study of the view of the critics of upamāna reveals that they, however, reject the independent status of upamāna as a means of knowledge, they are including it under other means of knowledge accepted by them. Upamāna is of great practical value in every day life and many other things are known – through the upamānas. So /

upamāna is an efficient instrument of valid knowledge and it would not be difficult to regard as a separate means of valid knowledge.

CHAPTER - I

“NYĀYA ŚĀSTRA AS A PRAMĀNAŚĀSTRA”

THE DEFINITION OF PRAMĀNA

The ancient Hindus classify the systems of Indian philosophy into two i.e., Āstika and Nāstika. The Āstika-mata or Orthodox school are six in number viz, Sāṃkhya, Yōga, X Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrvamīmāṃsa and Uttaramīmāṃsa, which are generally known as the six systems or Śaddarśana. Mokṣa or final emancipation from the earthly bondage forms the chief aim of every system of philosophy in ancient India. The final emancipation can be attained through the correct knowledge of the objects. The Ātma or self is attaining liberation through the Yatharthajñāna or X Prama of the objects of knowledge. The real knowledge gives the discriminative power to a man, which enables him to accept or reject the things. So it is clear that the true

knowledge is the root cause of the success of human being. According to the Nyāya philosophy the knowledge being a quality and the soul being its substratum, the soul is the material cause or samavayīkāraṇa of the knowledge. The soul acquires the knowledge with the help of the sense organs. Logicians accept four kinds of valid knowledge. They are Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal Testimony. The means of valid knowledge are Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. Different sense organs are the Pratyakṣapramāṇa, knowledge of pervasion is the Anumānapramāṇa, the knowledge of comparison is Upamānapramāṇa, and the knowledge of words is the Śabdapramāṇa.

One who is being guided by the desire to seek the object and lead to the activity is called pramātr. Pramāṇa is the instrument by which the knower rightly knows the object. Prameya

is the object to be known and pramiti is right knowledge of the object which is the indispensable means for the attainment of the highest end of life. The means of knowledge provides the path for correct understanding of the worldly objects as well as the metaphysical investigation. The Naiyāyikas divide the knowledge into two as anubhava and smr̥thi. Anubhava is again divided into two yathārtha or real and ayathārtha or unreal. Yathārthanubhava is otherwise called prama or pramiti and ayathārthanubhava is called bhrama or aprama.

Goutama says in his Nyāyasūtra that the real knowledge of the sixteen categories:-

(प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पा :।)

leads to "Summun bonam" or Liberation. Samsāra is a beginning less series of births and deaths. It is a bondage due to ignorance. The Nyāya describes the bondage as sorrow and the sorrow is

due to birth, birth is due to action (adṛṣṭa), action is due to desire hatred etc. and desire etc. are due to false knowledge¹. So when the false knowledge is lost, then the desire etc. will not occur. When there isn't the desire etc. then the actions (merit or demerit) cannot exist. When there is no action, (adṛṣṭa) then the series of births and deaths will not occur. When the series of births and deaths are hindered then there is no chance for sorrow. The total absence of sorrow is the liberation. Thus it became clear that through the true knowledge liberation can be attained. For attaining true knowledge, the means of valid knowledge are very necessary. Thus the means of valid knowledge possesses an important place in all systems of philosophy. The Nyāyadarśana is a system, which defines and describes the means of valid

¹ दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ।

(Nyāyasūtra, I, 1, 3)

knowledge in a systematic way. So it became famous as Pramaṇasāstra.

The tradition of dealing with the issue of the Pramāṇas or the true means of knowledge commenced with the Nyāya system in Indian philosophy. So Nyāya system stand first to attach priority to this problem even though it is discussed in all the major schools like the Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhists and others. That is why the Nyāya system is known as “the Pramaṇasāstra – the science of logic and Epistemology.

The history of Indian logic may be divided into three periods viz. Ancientⁱⁱ (650 B.C – 100 A.D) medieval (up to – 1200 A.D) and modern from (900 A.D). The standard texts for each of these periods are Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, P ramaṇasamuccaya by Dignaga and Tattvacintāmaṇi by Gangeśa Upādhyāya respectivelyⁱⁱⁱ. The ancient period of Nyāyasāstra begins with

ⁱⁱ Satiṣcantra Vidhyabhusana

ⁱⁱⁱ History of Indian Logic

Gautama, his Nyāyasūtra being the basic text. It began to attain its development with the Nyāyabhaṣya of Vātsyāyana. Nyāyavartika of Uddyōtakara, Nyayavartika Talparyatīka of Vacaspatimiśra and Nyāyavartīkatalparyatika Parisudhi of Udayanacarya are the expositories of Nyāyadarśana.

It was in the medieval school of Indian logic that Pramāṇa gained supremacy. Jainas and Buddhists were two powerful sects who conducted the matter and method of the medieval period which makes period different from ancient school. The ancient period deals with the doctrine of the soul and its salvation as well as the rules of debate and true reasoning. During the medieval period the Buddhist and Jaina schools attained strength.

✓ Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga (557 – 569 A.D) was the standard text of Buddha logic. The medieval period mainly deals with one category viz. pramāṇa which touches upon other categories. In this period numerous technical terms are coined and the theory of syllogism was given more importance.

7/10



The medieval logic thus formed, came to be known as Pramaṇasāstra the science of right knowledge. After Dignaga, the realistic school also turned to epistemology because they had to face new challenge of Dignāga school against realism. As all Orthodox realistic schools were the main targets of attack by the Dignāga school, they shaped their epistemology. Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika did not change so much its theories but they received new devices to meet the objection of the opponent. Thus epistemology became the principal branch of philosophy.

Epistemology or the theory of knowledge has acquired special importance in European philosophy, in the modern period, particularly in the philosophies of Locke, Hume and Kant^{iv}. Kant thinks that without a prior critical examination of the elements, sources and limits of knowledge we should not engage in metaphysical discussion. So he regarded all previous philosophy as dogmatic as contrasted with his own critical philosophy. In

^{iv} The cultural heritage of India P.No.548

more recent times, however, the new American realists have tried to oppose the general modern European trend, initiated by Kant, that the theory of knowledge should precede the theory of reality. They have chosen to be consciously dogmatic. They are led to this position by a kind of reaction against the use of epistemology made by most modern idealists for establishing idealistic theory of reality.

But in India the position had been otherwise. From the very beginning, in different systems of philosophy until recent times, discussion on the problem of knowledge (including doubt and error) have formed as an essential part of philosophy. All schools of Indian philosophy regarded ignorance as the root cause of human sufferings. So the true knowledge is necessary to overcome or minimize suffering of the human being. Vatsyāyana voices the feelings of all Indian thinkers on this matter while in commenting upon the first sūtra of Gautama. He says that the study of the pramāṇa is necessary, because through it alone we

can properly know reality and thereby guide our actions so as to be able to attain desirable ends and avoid sufferings.

Epistemology becomes closely linked up with ontology and both of them again with ethics. Knowledge and moral perfection are regarded as necessary to each other in almost all systems of Indian thought. Sometime knowledge is regarded as the means to the good life, sometimes again normal purity is regarded as the two inseparable aspects of perfection. In the course of the development of the Indian systems interest in epistemology increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussion of almost every school.

Varieties of Pramāṇa

Indian philosophy presents a variety of opinions regarding the source of means of cognition or pramāṇas. Different schools recognize different number and kind of pramāṇas. Their position

is as follows: - Cārvākas accept only Pratyakṣa as the means of valid knowledge. Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika accept two viz. Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, Sankhyas and certain Naiyāyikas accept three viz. Pratyakṣa, anumana, and Śabda. The Naiyāyikas accept four pramānas – Pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and Śabda. Prabhakaramīmāṃsakas accept arthāpati also along with the four pramaṇas and Bhāttamimāṃsakas accept anupalabdhī also along with the others. Paurāṇikas accept Sambhava and Aitiha also. Thus it is very clear that there is difference of opinion in the number of valid knowledge^v.

चार्वाकस्तावदेकं द्वितयमपि पुनर्बौद्धवैशेषिकौ द्वौ
भासर्वज्ञश्च सांख्यस्त्रितयमुदयनाद्याश्चतुष्कं वदन्ति ।
प्राहुः प्राभाकराः पञ्चकमपि च वयं ते पि वेदान्तविज्ञाः
षट्कं पौराणिकास्त्वष्टकमभिदधिरे संभवैतिह्ययोगात् ।।

^v Narayana – Manameyodaya P.No.9

SCHOOLS	MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE							
	PARTYAKṢA	ANUMĀNA	UPAMĀNA	ŚABDA	ARTHAPATHI	ANUPALABDHI	SAMBHAVA	AITIHYA
Cārvāka	Pratyakṣa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bauddha	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vaiśeṣika	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sāṅkhya	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	-	Śabda	-	-	-	-
Nyāya	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	Upamāna	Śabda	-	-	-	-
Prabhākara	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	Upamāna	Śabda	Arthāpathi	-	-	-
Bhāṭṭa	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	Upamāna	Śabda	Arthāpathi	Anupalabdhi	-	-
Vedānta	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	Upamāna	Śabda	Arthāpathi	Anupalabdhi	Sambhava	-
Pratyakṣa	Pratyakṣa	Anumāna	Upamāna	Śabda	Arthāpathi	Anupalabdhi	Sambhava	Aitihiya

The Concept of Pramāṇa

Pramāṇa is the most effective cause of prama. “Pramāyaḥ karaṇam pramāṇam”, Karaṇa is a form of Kāraṇa. The word Karaṇa is defined variously by different philosophers. According to Pāṇini, the most efficient cause is called Karaṇa^{vi}. In Nyāyaphilosophy, uncommon cause (Asādhāraṇakaraṇam)^{vii} and the cause having an action (Vyāpāra) are called Karaṇa. According to certain Naiyāyikas Vyāpāravadasadhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam, but certain other Naiyāyikas say that phalayogavyavacchinnaṁ kāraṇam karaṇam.

Prama or real knowledge, pramata or the knower of real knowledge, Prameya or the object of real knowledge and pramāṇa or means of real knowledge are the four important aspects of epistemology. Although four aspects equally deserves same consideration, the pramāṇa are told as the most important. The

^{vi} साधकतमं करणम् । सू. No.I 1,42 (Vyakarana siddhantakaumudi)

^{vii} Tarkasamgraha P.No.22

supreme importance of the pramāṇas amongst the four objects is due to its being the direct cause of the real knowledge. The other three factors depend upon pramāṇa for their existence. Uddyotakāra gives a clear-cut picture on the concept of the pramāṇas in the Nyāya system. The pramāṇa is regarded as a 'cause' of cognition because it is from the pramāṇa that the cognition proceeds. It is regarded as instrument because the cognition of the object is accomplished by means of pramāṇas. So it is the most efficient means of knowledge for producing the cognition.

It may be rejected that the definition of pramāṇa is not right, because it can apply to the other factors of cognition, viz.. the cognizer and the object of cognition these two are also the cause of cognitions or upalabdhīhetu, since they share this common character with pramāṇa. If the definition is not intended to cover these two factors, it is necessary to indicate the difference between pramāṇa on the one hand, and the cognizer and the

object of cognition on the other. Uddyōtakāra replied to this rejection, explaining the difference between the two. The function of the cognizer and the object of cognition lies in, and duly fulfilled by, the setting of the Pramāṇa as the instrument. On the other hand pramāṇa does not have its function fulfilled except when it produces the cognition. And it is for this reason that the pramāṇa, and not the cognizer and the object of cognition, is regarded as the real cause of cognition. This is the difference between the pramana pramatr and Prameya regarding the pramahetutva. Uddyōtakāra says that the characterization of pramāṇa is not verbal jugglery but certainly has a meaning. The most efficient cause is that, presence and absence of which regulates the presence and the absence of the effect. When the cognizer and the object of cognition are absent, cognition naturally does not appear, it is only when the former two are present that the cognition occurs. But at the same time it does not follow that it must occur. However, when the pramāṇa has primary importance (atīśaya) as the most efficient cause, we have different types of

cognition, the object of the cognition when the cognizer also different but there is no difference in pramāṇas. Even the two factors, i.e., the cognizer and the object of cognition, are present, they do not have any casual efficiency or Kartṛtva towards the production of cognition until the pramāṇa appears. Pramāṇa is the last to occur in the production of cognition. According to Uddyōtakāra the contact between the mind and the self is present in all forms of cognitions, but it is the pramāṇa which indicates or specifies the contact that leads to a specific cognition.

The production of cognition has two types of cause, the general cause (Sadhāraṇa) and the specific cause (asādhāraṇa). The cognizer is a cause which holds good for every cognition, perceptive, inferential, analogical and verbal, equally the object of cognition is a general cause as it is the same in its cognition in all men. But pramāṇa pertains to each individual cognition that is produced, and it is therefore the principal cause of cognition. It is

this predominance (prādhanya) that makes it the most efficient cause.

Uddyōtakāra considers the following Buddhist objections since objects of different pramāṇas are distinct from one another, it is not right to speak of various pramāṇas. Each pramāṇa has a distinct object (Viśiṣṭaviṣaya). Sense-perception, takes for its object specific individuality and inference has generality (samānya) as its object. Neither sense perception cannot apprehend generally nor can inference apprehends specific individuality. And these are the only two pramāṇas Uddyōtakāra answers the objection as follows. In the first place there are not the two pramāṇas, but four pramāṇas. Secondly the objects apprehended are not of two kinds but of three viz, generality, individuality and uniqueness (tadvat). Thirdly the convergence of pramāṇa (Pramāṇasamplava) as one and the same object is cognized by more than one pramāṇa. For example the sense-organs being instruments where by things are being revealed, are

pramāṇa. Among these we find that while each of them has its own specific object, there are also many objects common to a number of the sense organs. Odour, for instance, is the specific object of the alfactory organ, but the earth is perceived by the two senses the skin and the eye, the cognition of being (satta) and qualitness (guṇatva) are produced by all the sense organs.

According to the Naiyāyikas there are three types of causes for every effect. They are samavayīkāraṇa, (inherent cause), asamavayīkāraṇa (non-inherent cause) and nimittakāraṇa (efficient cause). As far as the knowledge is concerned the knower (prāmāta) is the inherent cause and the contact of the knower and mind is the non-inherent cause. The object of knowledge etc, become the efficient cause.

The term pramāṇa is an ambiguous one. It is derived from the root ma (to know) with a prefix 'pra' and affix 'lyut'. With the 'lyut' the word pramāṇa can literally gives us three meaning viz,

the valid cognition (prama) when affix used in the abstract sense (bhāva). Secondly the cognizer (pramātr) when it used in the sense of agent (kartṛ). Thirdly the means of valid knowledge (sādhana) when it used in the sense of instrument (Kāraṇa). In Indian philosophy it has been used in all the three senses. In Nyāya generally the word pramāṇa used in the third sense. In the case of perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, the senses, the knowledge of linga or vyāpti, the knowledge of similarity and the knowledge of words are the means of valid knowledge respectively.

Goutama does not give any definition of pramāṇa he simply classifies the means of valid knowledge. He enumerated four means of valid knowledge. Vatsyāyana explains pramāṇas on the basis of its etymology. It is an instrument to produce cognition. Uddyotakāra follows the same view of Vatsyāyana. The later writers have accepted pramāṇa as an instrument of valid knowledge. Kaṇāda in the sūtra 'Adṛṣṭam Vidya' bring to notice

of the conception of pramāṇa as free from defects but Vatsyāyana's definition does not embody the character of its being defectless as defined by Kaṇāda. But he employs two new words cause and cognition. The successors of Vatsyāyana, tried to improve the definition of pramāṇa, Vacaspati includes 'artha' or object to the definition. He improved the definition of Pramāṇa as the cause of valid knowledge of an object. Jayantabhaṭṭa the author of Nyāyamañjari holds that pramāṇa is the collection of conscious and unconscious condition other than the subject and object, that produces a non-erroneous determinate and valid knowledge of an object. His definition is known as Sāmagripramāṇavada^{viii}. Udayana in his Nyāyakusumāñjali has defined pramāṇa as being the knowledge and not the means of knowledge, although it is within the range of the interpretation treating pramāṇa as instrument. Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists regard cognition itself as the main factor, in considering the nature

^{viii} Jayanta – N.M. Part I P.No.315

कर्तृकर्मविलक्षणसंशयविपर्ययरहितार्थबोधविधायिनी बोधाबोधस्वभावसामग्री
प्रमाणमिति युक्तम् ।

of pramāṇa. Pramāṇa is the instrument of cognition and cognition is the result of pramāṇa. According to Kumārilabhaṭṭa Pramāṇa is Phalānumeya jñāna-vyāpārah i.e. pramāṇam is the cognitive activity which is inferred from the result of cognition. Pārthasārathi Misra explains the nature of pramāṇa as the cognition of object, which has not already been cognized and which is also free from defects. His definition of pramāṇa is “Kāraṇa doṣabadhakajñāna-rahitam agrihitagrahijñānam pramāṇam”. The basic aim of the pramāṇa is to test the validity of various convictions. These convictions in general may be brought under the broad leading of jñāna which denotes true or false knowledge. When a man comes across various convictions he desires to verify their validity with pramāṇa. Perhaps with this intention Vatsyāyana states that Nyāya means the examination of an object through the pramāṇas^{ix}. According to the Buddha's

^{ix} N.Bh. I

“प्रापकज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।”^x i.e., the knowledge which makes us reach the object revealed by it.

Validity of knowledge

According to the Mīmāṃsākās one characteristic mark of valid knowledge is agrhitarthagrahakatva i.e., apprehending an object not apprehended before^{xi}. The knowledge of God is eternal. He has not object unapprehended before. Thus the criterion of valid knowledge does not apply in the case of God's knowledge. So God cannot be the substratum of valid knowledge. But Udayana refutes this opinion and maintains God as the substratum of valid knowledge.

अव्याप्तेरधिकव्याप्तेरलक्षणमपूर्वदृक् ।
यथार्थानुभवो मानमनपेक्षतयेष्यते ॥

Apprehending an object, unapprehended before is not the characteristic mark of valid knowledge, because it involves fallacy

^x Upamāna in Indian Philosophy P.No.13

^{xi} Kusumanjali IV Stabaka P.No.202

of less pervasiveness and of over pervasiveness valid knowledge is the true experience which is independent (does not depend on prior experience).

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that if the validity of knowledge consists merely of apprehending an object (arthagrāhakatvameva), then memory also will turn out to be a valid knowledge, since in memory too same object is apprehended. But memory, accordingly to the siddhantin, does not fall within the category of valid knowledge. Therefore, it must be admitted that validity of knowledge consists in apprehending an object not apprehended before.

According to Udayana the definition of valid knowledge is yathārthānubhava or true experience. The ancient philosophers did not extend the term prama to memory, because memory is necessarily dependent, as its object is the same as that of the original experience which produced it. Therefore the

authoritativeness of memory must stand for or fall with that of its productive factor. So he adds the epithet *anapēkṣataya* (independent) that is, valid knowledge or *prama* is *yatharthānubhava*, which is independent and does not depend on any prior experience. Since the definition of valid knowledge is *yatharthānubhava* and not *aghrītārthagrahakatva*, *Anubhava* is included in the four means of valid knowledge of the *Nyāyaśāstra* i.e. *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. To the question why memory is not mentioned as a separate means of valid knowledge, there is no answer. Memory is an indirect knowledge, because it arises only when a previous experience is recollected. But perceptual knowledge is direct as it arises from the sense object contact. According to Annambhaṭṭa ‘तद्वति तत्प्रकारकानुभवो यथार्थः। सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते।’^{xii} Vacaspatimiśra defines *prama* as the modification of *citta* or *cittavrtti* which apprehends an object that is undoubted, real and unknown^{xiii}. Praśastapāda divides the

^{xii} Tarkasamgraha P.No.34

^{xiii} Upamana in Indian Philosophy

knowledge into vidya and avidya which correspond to the valid knowledge and invalid knowledge respectively. Jaina logicians also regarded definiteness as the mark of valid knowledge. Vadidevasuri defines means of valid knowledge as definite knowledge which reveals itself and the other objects^{xiv}. स्वपरव्यवसायिज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । According to the Naiyāyika knowledge is an attribute of Atman. The Samkhya and the yoga considers knowledge as modification of the Buddhi. The Bauddhas and Mīmāṃsakās describe knowledge as an activity. Same schools like the Sāmkhyās and Pūrvamīmāṃsakās regard novelty as an essential part of valid knowledge. But Vaiśeṣika and Jaina do not consider novelty as a mark of valid knowledge. They included smṛti or remembrance as the cause of valid knowledge.

Vatsyāyana says that “Pramāṇatoḥ arthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam^{xv}”. According to him there can be no cognition of thing except through a pramāṇa. When a

^{xiv} Upamāna in Indian Philosophy

^{xv} N.Bh

cognizer (pramāta) apprehended a thing by means of pramāṇa, he desires either to accept or reject the thing. The activity of the cognizer stimulated by this desire to accept or reject the thing is known as pravṛtti. This activity is said to be 'fruitful', when it becomes related to its fruit (Phalānubandha). This activity comes under two heads i.e., effective or not effective. When a man acts after having apprehended his object by means of the real pramāṇās – his activity is called samārtha or fruitful. But when he acts apprehending his objects by means of the false pramāṇa his activity is asamartha or not fruitful. For an example :- when one knows the piece of shell as silver, here the activity of the person is asamartha because it is through the false knowledge i.e., the person understands the shell as silver. This knowledge is not valid because that knowledge does not help the person to attain the silver. The person has desire only in the knowledge of silver and not in the shell. But the person acted because he wrongly understood the shell to be the silver. Here there are two knowledge. The first invalid cognition of silver and the second

valid cognition of the shell. The cognition of silver is present in the mind of the observer – ‘this white substance silver in which there are two factors. Here the general one bright white substance, and the particular one is silverness. Here the general factor is common in both’. The above explanation holds that the pramāṇa is standing for instrument of right cognition, or real knowledge. Pramāṇa is thus the most efficient cause of cognition and the last to appear before the cognition arises.

✗ Svataḥprāmāṇya and Parataḥprāmāṇya

> The Mīmāṃsakas and the naiyāyikas differ in their opinion about the nature of the validity of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas holds that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic. According to them Svataḥprāmāṇya is the corner-stone as which the whole structure of the Mīmāṃsa philosophy is based. All the three schools of mimamsa viz, the schools of Bhaṭṭa, Prābhākara and Murarimiśra advocate the intrinsic validity of knowledge. Mīmāṃsa philosophy



asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering smṛti or memory, is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyāya hold that this validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation^{xvi}. According to the Bhāṭṭa-school knowledge is inferred by the linga jñātata (knownness) and along with knowledge its validity is also inferred. With the prabhākara school knowledge being self-illuminated apprehends itself. All knowledge according to the prabhākara has within its sphere triple objects, viz. knowledge, knower and the object known. The knowledge takes the following term – 'I know the jar'. This knowledge comprises the knower (i.e. Soul), the object known (viz the jar) and the knowledge. As the knowledge is apprehended by the self illuminated knowledge itself, its validity is also apprehended by that knowledge. Prabhākara says that knowledge derives its validity from its own general causes. Gangēśa⁷ opposes this view by saying that if the validity of knowledge was derived from the general grounds of knowledge

^{xvi} A History of Indian Philosophy. P. No.372.

itself, the invalid knowledge would have been identical with valid knowledge^{xvii}. Gangēśa concludes that the validity of knowledge is not derived from its general grounds or cause. According to him it is derived through special cause called instrument. The general grounds of knowledge are the union of the tactual surface with the mind and that of the latter with the soul, while special causes are different. The special cause of perception is the intercourse of a sense organ with its object without any hindrance, that of inference is the consideration (the knowledge of premises) that of comparison is the knowledge of similarity and that of verbal testimony is the knowledge of words. Our knowledge of colour, for instance, is generated through contact of our eye with the colour and that is a valid knowledge, without any hindrance. Gangēśa further says that our consciousness of the validity of a particular knowledge does not arise from our consciousness of the particular knowledge itself but from a different source viz, inference from the fruitful correspondence between our knowledge (idea) and the activity prompted by it. According to him this knowledge is valid

^{xvii} H.I.L. P.No.408.(Satischandra Vidhyabūṣana

because it is conducive to activity which is fruitful. Whatever is not conducive to activity (which is fruitful) is not valid knowledge.

According to the school of Murarimiśra, knowledge arises in the form 'this is a jar'. After that arises the reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya). Defective cognition apprehends the knowledge, and along with the knowledge it apprehends the validity of the knowledge also. The factor common in the view of all the three Mīmāṃsakās is that the validity of knowledge is apprehended by the same causal aggregate that apprehends the knowledge itself. But they differ in respect of the causal aggregate. According to Bhaṭṭa validity is apprehended by inference. With the prabhākara it is apprehended by the self illumined knowledge. According to Mūrāri it is by reflective cognition. The view that the validity of knowledge is apprehended by the same causal aggregate that apprehends the knowledge is expressed in other words when it is said that the validity of knowledge is intrinsically known.

The Naiyāyika examines the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge and ultimately rejects it. They uphold the theory of the extrinsic validity of knowledge. Udayana offers the following syllogistic reasoning to establish the extrinsic validity of knowledge. 'Validity is extrinsically known, since at the stage of non-recognition it is doubted, like invalidity^{xviii}. Non recognition (anabhyasadaśa) means of absence of recognition, recognition is repetition (avṛthi). Recognition consists in the generation of knowledge, the like of which has already been produced. For example when a person perceives water in a lake from a distance in which lake he has taken bath? the other day, the knowledge of water he attains there is a knowledge that arises at the stage of recognition. For this knowledge is similar to what he attained the other day. Doubt does not arise about the validity of this knowledge. When one perceives the water in a lake for the first time from a distance, knowledge of water at the time arises at the stage of non-recognition. The validity of the knowledge is doubted. If validity is to be known intrinsically, such doubt must

^{xviii} Nyaya Kusumanjali P.No.76

not arise. For, when the knowledge of water is apprehended either by its self-illuminated character, or by jnatatalinga, or by reflective cognition, its validity too must be apprehended along with it^{xix}. In this case there should not arise the doubt whether this is a valid knowledge or not. But there arises doubt, therefore it may be admitted that when knowledge is apprehended, its validity has not been apprehended. Validity is inferred from the successful activity. The inference is thus – this is a valid knowledge, because this leads to successful activity. Hence validity is not apprehended by the causal aggregate that apprehends the knowledge. It is on the other hand, inferred by a different hetu, viz, successful activity.

Role of Pramāṇa in Navya Nyāya

The Navya Nyāya or modern school of Indian logic is a stage of development of Nyāyavaiśeṣikā philosophy. Prācīna

^{xix} Nyaya Kusumanjali P.No.76 (the line should be quoted)

Nyāya paid more attention to prameyās – the entities of the world.

Navya nyāya made more stress on pramāṇa – the source of valid

knowledge. It begins with the epoch making work Tattvacintāmaṇi

of Gangēśopādhyāya who belonged to 12th century A.D.

Gangēśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi is the first and great work of Navya

Nyāya because it is the elaborate and systematic work which

confined its treatment of the theory of pramāṇa. It is arranged in

four books, being titles 'Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and

Śabda. Gangēśa's work differs from the old Nyāya in that he

accepts many texts of the vaiśeṣikās school and in his

arrangement of Nyāya teaching under four heading rather than

under the sixteen padarthas of old Nyāya. A galaxy of writers and

thinkers, led by the Pakṣadhara Misra, Reghunatha Śiromaṇi,

along with distinguished bond of commentators have developed

and refined the thoughts of Gangēśa. This logical inquiry into the

means of valid knowledge is called pramāṇavāda. Gangēśa lived

in an age when Buddhism had almost disappeared in India. His

attacks were more against the Mīmāṃsa, the Vēdānta and other

living schools of philosophy. But above all the newness of Gangēśa's method is newness of style and organization. His style and technique of Navya Nyāya came to light in Nyāya system. He is generally accepted as the father and supreme leader in Indian Neologic. The general problem of validity has been divided by Gangēśa into three parts :- evidence of validity, genesis of validity and definition of validity. Each part again is divided into two sections. Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhāntapakṣa^{xx}.

Pramāṇa in Cārakasamhita

The Carakasamhita is famous as one of the remarkable accomplishment of ancient Indian sciences. Carakasamhita (500 AD) a medical treatise named after the compiler Caraka supplies the elementary ideas of epistemological doctrines. Carakās effort was to achieve perfectness in defining the means of right knowledge applying to the healing method of Āyurvēda. According to Satiscandra Vidyabhuṣaṇa, Caraka the compiler

^{xx} Validity of knowledge - Introduction P.No. I

lived in first century A.D, so chronologically Caraka stands first among the writers of these systems. The indebtedness of Nyāyasūtra to Caraka Samhita is disputedly admitted^{xxi}, Carakasamhita receives the four means for getting correct knowledge or pramāṇās. According to Carakasamhita everything can be divided into two categories true and untrue. These can be examined by taking recourse to one of the following four methods. viz, Scriptural testimony (words of sages), perception, inference and reasoning.

द्विधमेव खलु सर्वं सञ्चासञ्च तस्य चतुर्विधा
परीक्षा आप्तोपदेशाः, प्रत्यक्षं, अनुमानं युक्तिश्चेति ।^{xxii}

The epistemological doctrines appear in the first, third and fourth book called respectively, Sūtrasthāna, Vimānasthāna and Sarīrasthāna. He declares all things should be tested properly and things are only of two kinds either exist or non-exist. The standards of their test are fourfold. They are reliable assertion, sense perception, inference and continuous reasoning four

^{xxi} H.I.L. P.No.26

^{xxii} Carakasamhita P.No.210

standards of test (Pramāṇa) Caraka mentions even aupamya or analogy which opines also help to assess things properly. These five standards of a test (Pramāṇa) are collectively named as parīkṣa Hetu or pramāṇa.

CHAPTER - II

FOUR MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IN

NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Logicians accept four means of valid knowledge, they are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

PERCEPTION

Perception is the most fundamental source or court of appeal in any claim to knowledge though every knowledge need not arise from perception. Materialists in India and else ware admit sense perception alone as evidences. According to their opinion 'seeing is believing'. Goutama's definition of perception is the starting point of the Nyāyavaiśeṣikā's epistemology. It is admitted by all philosophical schools to be the most basic and fundamental source of knowledge. The

classical definition of perception is given by Gautama in the fourth sūtra of the first chapter of the Nyāya sūtra. Perception is superior than inferential, analogical and verbal cognitions because with this pramāṇa our desire for certain knowledge is fulfilled. Hence it is predominant. When a person seeks the knowledge of an unknown object, if he is told of it by a reliable person and has the verbal cognition of an object, there is still a desire to see the things with his eyes. After seeing the thing directly he does not search any kind of knowledge about it. So we can understand that the perception is the final test for real knowledge and the eldest of the pramāṇās. Here Goutama was fully justified in putting perception first in his list of four pramāṇās. Without perception no other instrument of valid knowledge is possible. Hence perception is considered 'supreme' among the pramāṇās. Perception is the knowledge which arises from the contact of senses with its objects, and which is

determinate, unnamable, and non-erratic. Goutama defines perception by mentioning only its special cause (asādharaṇa-kāraṇa). Perception is the knowledge not due to the instrumentality of another knowledge. So it is known as jnana – akarana-kam jnanam. It is the knowledge which occurs directly and immediately. Among to the Naiyāyikās perception is the knowledge which is not mediated by other knowledge. Inference is produced through the knowledge of a sign or linga. Upamana is produced through the knowledge of a Sadṛsyajñāna and verbal testimony is produced through the knowledge of a word but perception is not produced by the knowledge of any instrument of knowledge. In short, Vyaptijñāna, Sadṛsyajñāna, and padajñāna are the uncommon causes of Anumitijñāna, upamitijñāna and sābdabodha respectively. But any kind of knowledge does not become the uncommon cause of perception. The sense organs are hold as the uncommon cause of perception.

Goutamas definition of perception is that "Intriyaṛthasannikaṛṣotpannan jñānam avyapadēsyam avyabhicari vyavasyātmakam pratyakṣam". Goutama's definition sets four conditions each of which is necessary for a judgment. (1) It is derived from the contact between sense organs and the object, (2) it is avyapadēśya 'not verbal' (3) it does not wander (avyabhicari) and (4) it is definite (vyāvasayatmaka). Perception is the knowledge which is produced from the sense object contact and which is not due to the words. The prominent position of this definition was accepted by all the later Nyāyaphilosophers. So this is known as the Nyāya definition of perception.

According to Annambhaṭṭa "Intriyaṛtha Sannikaṛṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam". Viswanatha pañcānana says that "Intriyaṛjanyam jñānam pratyakṣam". The sense-object

ⁱ N.S I 1,4.

ⁱⁱ Tarkasamgraha.

ⁱⁱⁱ NyayaSiddhanta Mukthavali P.No.233.

contact is called sannikarṣa or pratyasathi. चक्षुरादिनामिन्द्रियाणां

घटादिभिरर्थैः सह सन्निकर्षेण यत् ज्ञानं जायते तत् प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते ।

Dignaga does not give any definition of perception, which is well known as the knowledge of the object derived through the channel of the senses. But he describes perception which being freed from the pre-conception. It is unconnected with name, genus etc. Suppose a man in twilight mistakes a rope for a snake, his knowledge of the snake is a pre-conception and it is not connected with the name, as we can perceive a thing without knowing its name. Perception is called Pratyakṣa because it arises through the relation to the senses (akṣam akṣamprati). The akṣa or sense organs are five viz, eye, nose, tongue, ear and skin. The sense organs have an important role in the theory of perception. The five sense organs have different sense objects and they are of five different elements and they pass the property of the elements to which they belong. Nose is the sense organ it is

produced from earth, its object is smell which is also the property of the earth. Tongue is the sense organ, it is produced from water, and its object is taste, which is also the property of the water. Eyes are the sense organ it is produced from light and its object is colour, which is also the property of the light. Skin is the sense organ, it is produced from air, and its object is touch which is also the property of air. Ear is the sense organ it is the either within the cavity of ear, and its object is sound, which is the property of ether.

The contact of the sense organs with the object is constituted as a nimitta kāraṇa or efficient cause of perception. This contact has been mentioned separately in Goutama's Pratyakṣa sūtra. In the process of perception the soul first comes in contact with the mind, then the mind contacts with the sense organs and lastly the sense organs comes in contact with the object. To produce the knowledge

of perception the union of the soul with the mind that of mind with the sense organs and the sense organs with their objects are needed.

Intriyaṛtha Sannikarṣa (Sense object contact)

Gautamā's definition of perception gives an important position to the sense-object contact. Only through the sense-object contact we can understand the knowledge of all things. In Nyāyasūtra Gautama mentions only five senses. The contact of the sense with akasa or empty space does not result in any perceptual knowledge, because empty space is imperceptible for any one of the senses. The Buddhists object that neither the visual nor the auditory sense can function after reaching the object because there cannot be any actual contact between these and the objects perceived. A sense means the particular organ of the body where it is

said to be located. There is no sense over and above the organ. Uddyōtakāra Kumāṛila and Vacaśpatimisra critically refute the Buddhist view. This objection is not correct because without the contact between the sense and the object there cannot be any perceptible knowledge. So Gautama is justified in claiming that perception is the knowledge resulting from sense object-contact.

The opponent says that the perception cannot be produced when a person who is sleep or whose mind is pre occupied with other things. It is not a valid hetu, as it involves self contradiction i.e. it denies that the mind sense contact involved in perception^{iv}.

Regarding this objection Vātsyāyana says that the perception could not be produced during the time of sleep

^{iv} व्याहतत्वादहेतुः । (N.S, II,1,28.)

when one's mind is pre occupied with other things, would seem to indicate that perception is brought about by sense object contact only. Moreover “ तैश्चापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषणम् ” इति सूत्रेण importance of the sense-object contact is perceived, hence the above mentioned object is not valid. So we can establish that the sense-object contact is more important in the knowledge of perception than mind sense contact.

Vātsyāyana also states that it was not the intention of sage Gautama to include all necessary causes of the perception in the aphorism. He only states the most important cause of the perception. There are five external organs and one internal organ. So there will be six kind of perception. In all these six kind of perceptions, the contact between the organs and the object is necessary. In each perception, the organs and objects vary. But the contact of

the mind with the sense organ, doesn't vary. It is common to all perceptions.

ARTHA OR OBJECT

The word artha or object is used in the sūtra in the sense of only perceptible object. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and these senses. He uses the word artha to indicate that only the contact of the sense with the appropriate object results in its perceptual knowledge . The contact of the sense with the empty space or akaṣa does not result in any perceptible knowledge, because empty space is imperceptible, i.e., not an object appropriate for any one of the senses.

Mind

The mind is an internal organ, but it has been separately mentioned because of its distinctive character. The senses are constituted by the elements, are restricted each to its own province, and possess attributes. The mind on the other hand, is not composed of any material element. It is the common cause of all cognitions. Although the mind has not been mentioned by Goutama in his sūtra which states the sense organs, it has an important role in the process of perception. Some say that Goutama's definition of perception is incomplete because it arises a doubt whether the mind and self have any part to play in the theory of cognition. Their objections are, the definitions of perception is untenable^v. The perception cannot arise unless there is a

^v प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिः असमग्रवचनात्। (N.S. II,1,20.)

contact between self and mind^{vi}. Another objection is that, in this definition perception (dik) place, time and ākāśa would also have to be mentioned^{vii}.

Goutama answers to the above mentioned objections. According to him cognition is a quality of the self and its occurrence depends upon mind self contact is also regarded as a cause of perception. If the sense object contact did not depend upon the mind-sense contact, we would have simultaneous cognitions of the things. This is opposed to Goutama's description of the mind. The mind which is an atomic substance cannot be conjoined with more than one sense organ at a time. So perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it

^{vi} नात्ममनसो : सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः । (N.S. II,1,21.)

^{vii} दिग्देशकालकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः । (N.S. II,1, 22)

requires also a conjunction of the mind, Uddyōtakāra also replies to the objections. He says that direction, place, time and ākāśa have no capacity to produce cognition because they are eternal and present everywhere. But this proximity is something, which cannot be avoided. If such factors are to be treated as the causes, there must be some special reason for it. For instance the hot touch of light is not regarded as the cause of its perception of its colours, though it is present at the time. The colour of the light is regarded as the cause of its perception because it has the capacity to produce the perception. In every form of knowledge the contact between mind self is involved, hence the above mentioned objection is not correct, whenever perception occurs there must be the mind self contact.

Goutama rejects the view that there is only one sense organ and other organs are the modification of it. The

objector says that the skin has extended all the sense-organs, so that when it is present there is perception and when it is absent there is no perception at all. Goutama criticizes this opinion that if we are accepted the skin organ is the only sense organ it would be able to apprehend all sensible objects. If the tactual organ is regarded as only sense organ the blind would perceived the colour and deaf would acquired the knowledge of the word. So this opinion is not correct. Again the tactual organ is treated as the only sense organ there would be simultaneous perception of colour, sound etc. The self would come in contact with the mind, the mind with the tactual organ and the tactual organ with sound colour etc. This simultaneous perception is impossible. Moreover on the destruction of this tactual organ all perception will be impossible.

The causes of Pratyaksaināna

Perception occurs when our sense comes into contact with an object which has Mahatva. If objects are not qualified by Mahatva they cannot be perceived. Hence one of the causes of perception is Mahatva. In the case of visual perception, contact of light is must. An object can be perceived only if there are the above said qualities. In the visual perceptions Udbhutarupa also considered as a necessary cause.

Six kinds of sense-object contact

Six kinds of sense-object contact are Samyoga, Samyuktasamavaya, Samyuktasamavetasamavaya, Samavaya, Samavedasamavaya and Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva.

Trandem
55

The six kinds of perception is divided into two i.e. Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa and Savikalpakapratyakṣa. According to Vātsyāyana and certain other like Kēśavamisra etc. the instruments. The instruments of perception is of three kinds. On certain cases it is the sense organ itself, in same cases it is the sense-object contact, and in certain others it is the knowledge itself.

The difference between Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa and Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa.

According to Annambhaṭṭa “Nisprakārakam jñānam Nirvikalpakaṁ and Saprakārakam jñānam savikalpakam”^{viii}. The various process involved in perception first the soul prompts the mind, the mind get into touch with the sense organ, which in turn goes forward to contact the object,

^{viii} Tarkasamgraha P.No.20.

because the sense have the function of contacting the objects. After the sense-object contact immediately we get a knowledge of the thing that is Nirvikalpaka or indeterminate knowledge arises. This Visualises the object alone, as this is something without any idea of its name or any quality making the object definite. This instrument of such knowledge is the sense organ just as the axe is that of cutting. Here the sense-object contact is the mediate activity, just as the axe-wood contact is that of the instrument of cutting. After the indeterminate knowledge, the determinate knowledge or savikalpakajñāna arises, which visualizes the object observed as something with a definiteness. In this cognition sense-object contact becomes kāraṇa. The indeterminate knowledge is the mediate and the determinate knowledge itself is the result. With the Savikalpakajñāna we can understand the yatharthajñāna of an object that which includes a specification as this is Rama, this is brahmana this

is black. After the sense-object contact the Nirvikalpakajñāna originates hence the sense-object contact is the cause of it. After the Nirvikalpakajñāna a person tries to know the real knowledge of the object, thus the Nirvikalpakajñāna also is the cause of savikalpaka pratyakṣa. A savikalpakajñāna possesses 'contents'. These content or visayas are broadly divided as viśeṣya or qualified, prakāra or qualifier and samsarga or connection. On Viśeṣya there is Viśeṣyata, in prakāra there is prakārata and in samsarga there is samsargata. In nirvikalpakapratyakṣa these contents will not occur. So through the Nirvikalpakajñāna the clear knowledge of the object cannot be produced because of the absence of the vivid knowledge of the three typed contents. The distinction between Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception is absent not only in the Nyāyasūtra of Goutama, but also in the other sūtras of the Orthodox philosophical systems. The

Brahma-Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, which are hold to be the oldest philosophical sutras, do not give any definition of perception.

A clearcut difference between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perception was introduced for the first time in Indian philosophy by Dignāga. According to him Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka are not merely two kinds of perception with a differences of vividness and sequence, as was accepted by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school. The difference between them is fundamental and qualitative. The Nirvikalpaka is transcendental is the sense that it grasp a transcendental reality of which, although we have a sort of awareness, we are never conscious in terms of thought. The reason is that our intellect can never grasp the external reality, which is in the form of the unique particular (Svalakṣaṇa) and is transcendental. The scope of the intellect is restricted to the generalized form (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa) i.e., the empirical or

phenomenal. The two types of knowledge like Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka are quite different not only in their nature but also in the sphere of their operation. The Orthodox realist and particularly the Nyāyavaiśeṣika never accept that kind of distinction between them. But the qualitative difference in the nature of two kinds of perception was accepted by the later Nyāyavaiśeṣika, and it is undoubtedly due to the influence of Dignaga school.

According to the Naiyāyikas Savikalpakapratyakṣa is of two kinds viz, laukika or ordinary perception and alaukika or extra ordinary perception. Ordinary perception is of two kinds – internal (mānasa) and external (bāhya). In internal perception the mind which is the internal organ comes into contact with the physical states and processes like cognition, affection, contain, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. External perception takes place when the five external

organs of sense come into contact with the external objects.

The external sense organs are composed of material elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether and therefore each senses the particular quality of its element.

Alaukika is extraordinary perception is of three kinds –
Sāmānyalakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa and Yōgaja.

Inference (Anumāna)

The Major source of valid knowledge in

Nyāya Philosophy

Among the four means of valid knowledge in Nyāya philosophy, the main stress is on Anumāna Pramāṇa because it is the most important method for acquiring new knowledge. Its nature, form and content has been discussed by all schools of Indian philosophy. Inference is the central topic in Nyaya system and through which we can infer the non-existence of things. Through inference we are able to gain knowledge about things not available at the moment to perception. For example, we are able to know the cause of an occurrence by inferring on the basis of observed lawful relationships even though we failed to observe the causing event. Perception only grasps present objects while

inference grasps objects in the past, present and future. Except Cārvākās all systematists admit inference as a means of valid knowledge.

Anumāna is defined as anuniyate onena i.e., by which something is inferred. The etymological meaning of anumāna in anu means after and māna means measuring. The suffix anu has the force of the instrumental. In the smoke-fire inference perception is the instrument which is concerned with the sign and it leads to the cognition of something not yet perceived. It is a mental judgment which arises after something has been heard or observed through certain steps of reasoning based on the observed things.

Annambhatta's definition of anumāna is 'anumiti karaṇam' anumānam^{ix}. परामर्शजन्यज्ञानमनुमिति :। व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य हेतोः पक्षवृत्तित्वज्ञानं परामर्शः। paramarsa is the avyavahitapūrvavarthi kāraṇa for

^{ix} Tarkasamgraha.

anumiti which is called लिङ्गपरामर्शः । According to Annambhatta vyāptiviśiṣṭa pakṣadharmadhājñanam paramarsaḥ. The relation between hētu and sādhya is called vyāpti. येन पक्षे साध्यं साधयति स हेतुः। हेतुना यत् पक्षे साध्यैत तत् साध्यम्। हेतुना साध्यं यत्र साधयति स पक्षः।

After seeing the smoke in mountain a person 'the mountain is along with fire'. This anumiti does not arise without the co-existence of the hētu and sādhya. This relation between hētu and sādhya already had seen in many places महानसः, यज्ञशाला इत्यत्र. वह्निधूमयोः केवलसहचरदर्शनं न व्याप्तिग्राहकं द्विन्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्यैव व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वम्। After understanding the relation between the smoke and fire the person arrives near to the mountain and there also he sees the smoke in the pakṣa with his own eyes i.e. पक्षधर्मताज्ञानम्। Then he remembers the vyāpti and understand

‘ वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वतः’ इति। त.ट्ट. लिङ्गपरामर्शः। प्रथमं धूमदर्शने

पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमात्रं जायते। ततः व्याप्तिस्मरणानन्तरं व्याप्तिवैशिष्ट्यं हेतौ ज्ञात्वा तादृशहेतुः पक्षे पर्वते वर्तते इति ज्ञायते। अतः परामर्शः विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि भवति। एतस्य विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानस्य अनुमितिं प्रति हेतुत्वमवश्यमभ्युपगम्यम्। यत्र यत्र धूमः वह्निरस्तीति व्याप्तिज्ञानेन सामान्यतः धूमवर्तिदेशे वह्निः भवतीत्येव ज्ञानं भवितुं शक्यम्। अतो अत्र वह्निरस्ति अथवा पर्वतो वह्निमान् इत्यनुमित्युद्भवार्थं वह्निव्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य धूमस्य पर्वतादिविशिष्टस्य ज्ञानमावश्यकम्। एतद्विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि-ज्ञानमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शः स एवानुमितिं प्रति चरमकारणम्।

VYĀPTI

Vyāpti is an important factor for attaining inferential knowledge. There is diversity of opinion among the scholars about vyāpti. The Navya Naiyayikās accept that the knowledge of co-existence between hētu and sādhyā as well as the absence of deviation are the causes of ascertaining

vyāpti^x. According to Annambhaṭṭa 'Sāhacarya Niyamō

vyāpti सह चरत इति सहचरौ समानाधिकरणौ , एकाधिकरणवृत्तिः तयोर्भावः

साहचर्यं, सामानाधिकरण्यम् So हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्तभावाप्रतियोगि-

समानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः । Here smoke is hētu and mahānasa or

kitchen is hētvadhikaraṇa समानाधिकरण्यं धूमस्येति धूमः

व्याप्तिविशिष्टः । व्याप्तिः हेतोः धर्मः । The hētu plays a key role in

inference because without this we cannot infer. The

knowledge of hetu leads us to the knowledge of the sādhya.

In the context of inference a hetu is a thing whose relation to

a Sādhya is known. The coexistence between the hētu and

the sādhya are two types viz. 'Niyata and aniyata'. Aniyata

means variable or vyabhicārin and fixed. niyata means

invariable or avyabhicārin. The relation between smoke and

fire called Vyābhicāri because the fire without smoke can

exist independently, e.g. in case of fireball there is no smoke.

^x Major Hetvabhāsa P. No. 13.

In other words when we perceive fire on that account we cannot say there must be smoke. So vyabhicāritatva means that out of two things one can exist in the absence of other. On the other hand 'avyabhi charitatva' means not out of two things one cannot exist in the absence of the other. For example, the relation between smoke and fire is such that without fire smoke cannot exist. In our daily life we have seen in kitchen that smoke is always accompanied by fire. This type of concomitance shows that smoke cannot exist without fire. Again where there is smoke there is fire, where there is no fire there is no smoke. So we can say that smoke invariably exists with fire but fire need not invariably exist with smoke.

Goutama in his Nyāyasūtra, Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya and Uddyōtakara in his Nyāyavārtika do not mention Vyāpti.

Goutama's definition of Anumana is :-

‘अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्च।

From this sūtra we can understand the anumāna follows on perception, Vātsyāyana interprets the word तत् as perception of the relation between the problem or hetu and the probandum or sādhya (linga – linginsh – sambandha darśanam) as well as the perception of the proban (linga – darśanam). The proban or linga means 'the real reason' (hetu) as actually employed in inferential process. The probandum or lingi is the object actually inferred through the proban. Where there is the proban there is the probandum. The proban is the pervaded (Vyāpya) and the probandum it its pervader (Vyāpaka). Therefore, the relation between the proban and the probandum is the relation of the pervaded and the pervader (Vyāpyavyāpakabhava) i.e. called vyāpti.

Inference is defined as valid knowledge of a probandum from the knowledge of a proban in any subject of inference with invariable con-committance. It is made through the knowledge of a universal con committance between the probans and the prabandum. A proban exists in less sphere of time and place, e.g. smoke exists where there is a fire, but does not exist in heater. So its range is less than that of fire. A probandum exists in a greater sphere of time and space than a proban; e.g. fire exists in a red hot iron or a heater, where there is no smoke at all. So smoke may be called proban and fire may be called probandum due to their existence in the range of time space. A wide experience of con-committance is needed to affirm inference.

Vyapti is an important part in the process of inference. It is of two kinds :- anvayavyāpti and vyatirēkavyāpti. Anvaya vyāpti is ascertained by the knowledge of coexistence (sahacara) of

proban and probandum. Vyatirēkavyāpti is ascertained by the absence of probandum and absence of probans. Thus the invariable relation of fire and smoke is established by observing a number of times in which the two coexist (e.g. the kitchen) and further because of not observing any instance in which smoke exists without fire. 'where there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen' is the affirmative (positive type of vyapti) 'where there is no fire there is no smoke as in a lake' is the negative type of vyāpti.

Vātsyāyana holds that 'no inference can follow in the absence of perception'. Only when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other, and then he is able to infer the existence of the fire on the next occasion when he perceives smoke.

Goutama does not divide Anumāna as Svārthanumāna and pararthānumāna but he divides it into three types pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodrṣtam.

Pūrvavat :- On the word 'purvavat' purva is related to the probandum. In this anumāna effect or karya inferred from the cause or karaṇam. e.g. when we see clouds rising in the sky, we infer that there will be rain. Here inference relates to the future.

Śeṣavat :- in the word 'śeṣavat' sesa stands for the object which belongs to the same as the probandum. In which the cause is inferred from the effect, e.g. when we see that the river is full and current is swifter, we infer that there was rain. Here the sesavat inference relates to the past.

Samanyatō dṛṣṭa :- The word 'Samanyatōdṛṣṭa' means that which is related to the objects which are not perceptible. Bhaṣyakāra does not give any explanation about this kind of anumāna – but merely gives an example. We generally observed that whether a thing we saw in a place is seen in a different place at another occasion we come to the conclusion that it has moved, from this fact of general observation we infer the movement of the sun, even though we cannot perceive it. When the relation between proban and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from proban having the same nature with any other object. For. e.g. we infer Self from desire etc. are qualities. Qualities resides in a substance. We experience desire etc. They ought to have a substratum. Earth, water, fire, air etc. are not the substratum of desire. So we infer i.e. Self as the substratum of desire etc. Navīna Naiyāyikās divide anumāna as svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna.

Svārthanumāna or Inference for Oneself

परामर्शेन स्वस्यैव साध्यज्ञानजनकं स्वार्थम् । By the svārthanumāna a person gets convinced in his own mind. For. e.g. after ascertaining vyāpti between smoke and fire in the kitchen, one happens to go near a mountain and sees an unbroken line of smoke from the mountain, reaching the sky. Then he doubts "whether there is fire on the mountain and immediately he recollects the vyāpti". Here the sight of the smoke is the reason or hetu to infer the fire. Finally he concludes in his mind that as there is smoke, then the hill is possessing fire also i.e. mountain is fiery.

Parārthānumāna or Inference for Others

✓ प्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवप्रयोगेण परस्य साध्यज्ञानजनकं परार्थम् ।

After inferring himself a person use five membered syllogism for instructing others. The five membered syllogism is known as Nyāya and each member is called avayava. By means of the avayava a person can infer the sādhya. The members of the syllogism are pratijñā, hetu, udaharaṇa, upanaya and Nigamana. By means of the syllogism the hearer also understand the existence of the fire in the mountain, hence this is of the fire in the mountains, hence this is called parārthānumāna. Lingaparamarśa is the only cause for svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. Annambhaṭṭa opined that lingaparamarśa is anumāna. Linga is of three types :- anvayavyatireki, kevalanvayi and kevalanvayavyatireki, Anvayavyatireki :- for example 'where there is smoke there is fire' as in the kitchen. We have observed this directly from

the kitchen, the presence of the smoke and fire. Where there is no fire there will not be the smoke. This is vyatirekavyāpti. To which probans there are positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatirekīś) con-committance that proban is called anvayavyatireki.

Kevalanvayi :- when one gives a statement such as the pot is named because it is an object of knowledge of this statement. The probans and probandum both are Kevalanvayas. Here there is only one kind of vyapti viz. where there is the statement of being the object of knowledge there is the namedness. As there is no negative concomitance, there probans are called kevalanvayas.

केवलव्यतिरेकि :- व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि। यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात्, यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तत्गन्धवत् यथा जलम् ।

The peculiar characteristic of this type of vyapti which makes it different from other type. Here the gandha or odour is the probans. The itarabheda or the difference from others is the

probandum. The earth is different from water etc, because it possesses the odour. Here we cannot say 'where there is odour', there will be earthness, because the complete earth is pakṣa, there are no sapakṣās. Only there are vipakṣās. Vipakṣās are those in which the negation of probandum is decided. In this anumāna water etc. are the vipakṣās, because there is the negation of itarabhēda i.e. the negation of probandum. Where there is the negation of itarabhēda, there will be the negation of odour (water etc.) Here only vyatirekavyapti is available. So this proban is an example of Kēvalavyatirēki.

The members of the parārthanumāna

The five members are Proposition, Reason, Example, Confirmation and Conclusion.

1. The proposition is the declaration of what is to be proved

प्रतिज्ञा हेतुः उदाहरणम् उपनयः निगमनम् (साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा)

पर्वतो वह्निमान्

2. The hētu is the means of establishing what is to be proved on the basis of similarity to a homogeneous or heterogeneous example. (उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुः । तथा वैधर्म्यात् ।)

3. An example is a familiar instance which, through its homogeneity or its heterogeneity to the probandum, has or has not the same quality as what is to be proved (prabandum). साध्यसाधर्म्यात् तदधर्मभावी दृष्टान्तम् उदाहरणं तद्विपर्ययाद्वा विपरीतम् ।

4. The confirmation (उपनयः) is the form of a resume of what is to be proved on the strength of the example 'this so or this is not so'

उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथाप्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः ।

5. The conclusion is the restating of the proposition with reference to the hetu. (हेत्वपदेशात् प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम्।)

The parārthānumāna is considered as nyāyaprayōjya or nyāyasādhya. The five members of parārthānumāna is called syllogism or pancāvayava. The Vedantins and Mīmāṃsakās say that all the five members are not necessary for parārthānumāna. According to them प्रतिज्ञा , हेतु , उदाहरणम् वृद्ध उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि would be sufficient for parārthānumāna. The Buddhist says that only two members viz. udāharaṇa and upanaya would be sufficient. The naiyayikās opinions is that the incomplete syllogism, the hear mind would not pass through a methodical system of reasoning. The hearer would be put a lot of mental searching for the missing links, because the quickness of the mental activity and searching is not taken into account. Therefore the five members are

necessary to avoid the doubts of the hearer. This division of inference into svārtha and parārtha is one of the most vital topics in Indian logic. It clearly enabled the Nyāya system to reject the opinion of the opponents पञ्चावयवाः

The Buddhist also accepted the two kind of inference svārthānumāna and pararthānumāna. They gives different types of definition about svārtha and parārthānumāna. त्रिरूपलिङ्गाद्यदनुमेये ज्ञानं स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

हेत्वाभासः

Goutama's Nyaya sūtra is the first arranged work on hētvābhāsa. The later Naiyayikās hold Goutama's view regarding hetvābhāsa in the some modification.

Vātsyāyana points out that fallacies of the hetus are called hētvābhāsa because these hetu do not possess the

characteristic of the hetus proper and yet they appear like those hetus because of their similarity along with them.

Gangēśa provides three general definitions of hētvābhāsa there are : 1. Hētvābhāsa is the absence of the instruments of the inference. 2. Hētvābhāsa is that object which is known prevents the knowledge of linga from leading to an inference. Hētvābhāsa is that characteristic which prevents known inference. Gangēśa classifies hētvābhāsa as follows – savyābhicāra, viruddha, satpratipaksa, assiddha and bādhita.

1. By which object, a knowledge becomes opponent of the inference knowledge, that object is hētvābhāsa.

(यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिर्विरोधित्वं तत्त्वम् ।

2. That, which is the content of the real knowledge which is the obstrueter of an inferential knowledge, is the Hētvābhāda. (अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वम् ।)

UPAMĀNA OR COMPARISON

The Naiyāyikās accept upamāna as a third means of valid knowledge. The Buddhists reduce upamāna to perception and verbal testimony. The Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika reduce it to inference. The Jainas reduce it to recognition or Pratyabhijñā. The Mīmāṃsakas recognize it as a separate source of valid knowledge, but their account of it is different from that of Nyāya.

The sixth chapter of my thesis, I will highlight the importance and the necessity of accepting upamāna as a separate pramāna.

ŚABDA OR VERBAL TESTIMONY

Verbal Testimony is considered as a separate means of proof or a channel of new knowledge. In Indian tradition

the understanding of the meaning of a sentence uttered is known as Śābdaboda. Through the Śābdaboda a successful communication holds between the speaker and hearer, when a sentence is uttered. When a sentence is uttered an attentive hearer cognizes the words and understand the meaning of the sentence. This cognition of the meaning of a sentence is qualificative cognition or Viśiṣṭajñāna. When a meaningful sentence is uttered, the hearer, if he knows the language and is to attentive to it, immediately understand the meaning of the word elements in the sentence.

The systems of philosophies like, Mīmāṃsa, Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa had dealt with the Śabdapramāṇa. The Nyāya accepts the understanding of the sentence meaning as a distinct type of valid knowledge but the Vaiśeṣika a sister school does not accept śabda as a

separate means of valid knowledge. According to them it includes under inferential knowledge. The systems of philosophies like, Mīmāṃsa, Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa had dealt with the Śābdapramāṇa. Mīmāṃsakās prefer Bhāvanāmukhyaviśeṣyaka śābdabodha, Naiyāyikas admit prathamānātharathamukhya viśeṣyaka Śābdabodha and Vaiyākaranās regard dhātuarthamukhya viśeṣyaka Śābdabodha. For example(1) The effort is having chaitra as the agent, rice as the object, cookedness as the result.

(2) The chaitra is having the effort that generates the action which generates the state of cookedness which resides in the rice.

(3) The action of cooking which is present this time is having the agent chaitra and rice the object.

Śābdabodha originates from sabda or pada. Sabda is the karaṇa or cause for śābdabodha. Although all pramāṇas are equally important in view of acquiring knowledge, śābdapramāṇa which is

mentioned as a fourth means of valid knowledge in Nyāya philosophy deserves much consideration. According to famous poetician Dandin “This whole universe will become totally dark if the light in the form of word does not illumine till the end of the worldly existence.” The word or language is the medium of expression. By using the words we can express our ideas to others and by hearing words we understand others ideas. According to the older section of Naiyāyikās or praçyās verbal cognition is directly produced from the words. Therefore the linguistic utterances of words are the actual means of verbal cognitions.

Goutamas definition of sabda is “Āptopadeśaḥ Śabdaḥ”. According to Annambhaṭṭa “Āptavākyaṃ śabdaḥ”. A trustworthy person is called apta who has the direct knowledge of an object. Apti means the direct knowledge of an object. According to Vacaspatimisra the word ‘upadeśa’ stands for the advice for the benefit of others. So the advice

of the apta is regarded as Śabdapramāṇa. The word as an instrument of valid knowledge is of two kinds, having perceptible or dṛṣṭa and imperceptible or adrṣṭa of objects. The object which is attainable in this world is the one 'having perceptible objects' or dṛṣṭārtha and the object which is attainable in the other world is the one having imperceptible objects or adrṣṭārtha. (From this we can understand this division of words of the ordinary person and the seers).

Śabda is one of the twenty four qualities enumerated by vaiśeṣikas. Prastapadabhāṣya is the first systematic study and a scientific analysis of sound in the Vaiśeṣika field. Sound is proved to be the special quality of Ākāśa. Although the word śabda is used to denote the śabda as a quality and as a means of valid knowledge, there is difference in sense. The word 'śabda' when used in the sense of a means of valid knowledge either the word that is known or the knowledge of

Spells

a word is meant. Prācinanaiyāyikās say that *jñāyamanah śabdaḥ pramāṇam*. Annambhaṭṭa also accepted this view of the prācinanaiyāyikās. According to Navānanaiyāyikās padajñāna is a karaṇa of śābdabodha. So they regarded padajñāna is a śābdapramāṇa.

Padajanya Padārthopasthitih vyāparah.
Padajanyatvasca vṛtya bodhya. Vṛttisca
saktilakṣṇanyatarasambandhah. Tatha ca Padat saktya
lakṣṇaya va padajanya padarthopasthitih śabdabote
vyaparah. Phalam tu śabdabodhah.

According to Mukthavali :- *Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvaram*
tatra padarthadhihi śābdabodhah phalam tatra saktidhihi
sahakarini.

The knowledge of word is the instrument of verbal comprehension. The knowledge or recollection of the word meanings through word is the operation, verbal.

comprehension is the result, and the knowledge of denotative function or śakti is an aid. Śakti is of three kinds yoga, Rūdhī and Yogarūdhī.

Śakti or denotative function

The ancient Indian philosophers have studied completely the concept of 'śabda' as a pramāṇa. The word has the power to denote a meaning. This power is called śakti. According to Naiyāyikās the denotative power of the word is defined as the desire of God is the form of this meaning may be known from this word. *Asmāt padāt ayamarthō bōdhavyah iti Easwarēcca Śakti*. Denotative function is the relation of a word to its meaning. It is of the form of a divine will that such and such a word should denote such and such a thing. There are many devices to know the denotative power of the word. The Mukthāvali Viśwanādhapancānana explains the saktigrahōpāyah.

“Saktigrahāṃ

*vyakaranopamanakōśāpeavakyadvavaharatasca Vākyasya
śesdvivṛtervadanti sannidhyatasiddha padasya vṛddhaḥ.”*

The denotative function is apprehended by grammar, similarity, dictionary, statement of trustworthy person, usage, supplementary statement, paraphrase and contiguity of a well known word.

The denotative function is apprehended through the Vyakarana (Grammar) which gives the meaning of the roots. Thus one becomes aware of the meaning of the root ॥ as to be and that of ॥ to increase etc. The upamāna which gives the knowledge of an unknown object through the similarity of a well known object. Similarly the denotative function is apprehended through the dictionary. Thus we understand the meaning of “Vistarasravah” as Viṣṇu, because that word

is included in the synonyms of Viṣṇu in Amarakōśa. But Nyāyadarsana does not accept all the opinion of the kōśakāra. For example, a dictionary tells us that the denotative function of words such a 'blue' is with regard to the blue colour and as also to what is possessed of blue colour etc. but Nyāya darsan accept of clearness denotative function of the words like other etc is only with regard to blue colour alone. From the trustworthy persons also denotative function is known. For example, as from the statement of a trustworthy person the word 'pika' signifies a cuckoo, we get the denotative function of words such as pika.

Similarly from usage also the denotative relation is apprehended. For instance an elderly person giving directions says "Bring the jar" and hearing this another elderly person who is told to do so brings the jar, reflecting on this, a boy who stood near concludes that the act of bringing a jar is

the result of the words, 'Bring the jar'. Then in expressions like 'Remove the jar' and 'Bring the jar', he understands by a process of inclusion and exclusion the denotative function of words such as a jar with regard to the jar etc. as connected with certain acts. Similarly from supplementary statement also denotative function is apprehended. As in the sentence the porridge should be of a yava, the word yava is used by the Āryans to signify a particular long-awned grain (bārely) while the mleccas use it in the sense of panic seed (kangu). With regard to this we have the statement, 'Now other herbs become dry, in spring season, but (bārly) yava stand flourishing. From this supplementary statement we conclude that the denotative function of the word is with regard to the grain with long awns (barely and its use to signify panic seed is due to a mistaken notion about its denotative functions, for it is cumbrous to assume multiple denotative functions. In words like Hari, however, since there is no decisive

reasoning one way or the other, we have to assume multiple denotative function. Similarly from paraphrase also we apprehend denotative function. Paraphrase is a statement of the meaning of a word through a synonym. For instance the sentence, 'There is a jar', is paraphrased by sentence, 'there is a pitcher', hence the word 'jar' is known to denote a pitcher. Similarly the word 'cooks' is paraphrased the words 'does the cooking, from this we conclude effort. Likewise from the contiguity of well known word also denotative function is apprehended. As in a sentence like, 'A pika is signing sweetly in this mango tree, the denotative function of the word pika is apprehended to be with regard to a cuckoo, because of the contingents of the word 'mango tree'.

Cause of verbal cognition

Three distinct causes are needed to produce the śabdabodha, i.e, a unique (extraordinary) cause

asādharanakāraṇa or instrument (kāraṇa) (II) an intermediate cause (dvara) such as operation vyāpara and (III) an associate or auxiliary cause (sahakāri). For instance, in the process of producing a pot, here the stick is the instrument through which the pot is produced . Here the movement of the potter's of the potter's wheel is the operation in producing the pot and the same is the intermediate cause or operation. In this process clay etc, is the help in producing the pot, hence it is the associate cause. The knowledge of the words (padajñāna) is the unique cause, the recollection of the word meanings produced from the words (padarthadhī) is the intermediate cause or operation and the knowledge of the functional relation such as expressive power between words and meanings (saktidhī) is the associate cause or auxiliary cause.

Other auxiliary factors are required are (1) syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣa) (2) semantic competency (yōgyata) and

sannidhi or proximity. Annambhatta and Kēsavamisra regarded the definition of the means of verbal comprehension as the works of a trustworthy person viz, *Āptavākyam sabdaḥ iti. Padasamūho Vakyamarthaparisamāptau iti bhāsyakarah Vakyalakṣaṇam vadati.* Vākya is a collection of words which have three special qualities i.e, *ākāṅkṣa yogyata* and *sannidhi* For e.g., cat, camel, man, elephant, dog is not a sentence as it is wanting in verbal expectancy or *Ākāṅkṣa* among them. Similarly 'spray with fire', is not a meaningful sentence as the two words are lacking in *yōgyata* here 'fire' and 'spraying' are not capable of being construed together, because the instrumental case in '*agnina*' denotes that the fire is the instrument for the act of praying and fire is not capable of becoming such an instrument in as much as 'fire and act of spraying' do not join together through cause effect relation. Therefore the words '*angina sincet*' do not establish a meaningful sentence. Similarly if the word '*gām*' and '*ānaya*'

are uttered one by one with an interval of an hour between them the words lack proximity. Therefore the vākya or sentence is only such a collection of words which have all the three characteristic at the same time, e.g., '*Jyōtiṣtomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the sacrifice '*Jyōtiṣtomēna naditire*' (five fruits on the bank of the river) are correct sentence.

According to the mīmāṃsakās this 'śakti' is another padārtha or category, but Naiyāyika consider it as Samkēta sometimes a secondary meaning is denoted by the word. Here the word, by its power of lakṣaṇa denotes the secondary meaning.

Lakṣaṇa or implication

Lakṣaṇa which means relation with the denotative sense of the words. *Śakyasambandhaḥ gaṅgāyam ghosaḥ ityatra gaṅgapadasya tire lakṣaṇa. Gaṅgapadasya sakyarthah pravāhaḥ.*

In short without knowing the pramāṇās, we cannot conceive the reality of this world, as the pramāṇās are the only source to knowing the pramēyās. The naiyāyikās advocated four means of valid knowledge viz, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. In Mānamēyaparakāśika, Harijivandas defines pramāṇās are the right knowledge known by its use. The pramāṇa is the righteousness of any knowledge known by its use. Here pramāṇa means pramā, this definition is made to avoid false knowledge like the knowledge of silver in a shell. The use of the pramāṇa is to get the rightness of any object.

Viśiṣṭādvaitin admit that every knowledge is valid, 'sarvajñānām yathārtham'. The word pramāṇa denotes the rightness and utility of any knowledge, since it discriminates valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. To conclude the definition of pramāṇa, it is right knowledge and its rightness is known by its use in any time.

CHAPTER - III

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UPAMANA AND OTHER MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRATYAKSHA AND UPAMITI

Some authors lay stress upon the element of perception of similarity which is considered to be a karana of upamana. Kumarilabhatta states that as the knowledge of denotative relation is supposed to issue from perception of similarity, it can very well be a case of perception. (यावद्धीन्द्रियसम्बद्धं तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति स्मृतम्।) He again says that the element of remembrance is not a valid piece of knowledge, and the denotative relation is the sense object contact only (प्रत्यक्षे गवये सादृश्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षफलम्) the author of Nyayakandali and Srinivasadasa author of Yatindramatadipika also supported the opinion of Kumarilabhatta Purushottama the author of

Prasthānaratnākara holds that the purpose of upamāna can be served by the sense-object contact assisted by the remembrance of the similarity can through the authoritative statement.

(सादृश्यातिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकारेण संज्ञासंज्ञिपरिच्छेदोपपत्तौ
सादृश्यज्ञानादेर्मानान्तरत्वं - कल्पनस्यायुक्तत्वात् ।)

But Naiyāyikas establish upamāna as a distinct means of valid knowledge. They strongly opposes the inclusion of upamana under perception. According to Uddyōtakāra the rejection of the upamāna as a separate means of valid knowledge is based upon the misunderstanding of the real purpose of upamāna. Dignaga thinks that what is really apprehended through upamāna is either the resemblance to the cow or the existence of gavaya as qualified by the resemblance to the cow. This misunderstanding leads him to reject the upamāna as a separate means of valid knowledge.

If Dingnāga claims to desire such a meaning from the sūtras of Goutama, the criticism is based upon the non-understanding of the correct meaning of the sūtra. The purport of the statement of Goutama, however, is that one realizes the denotative relation through well-known similarity.

Jayantabhaṭṭa rejects the perceptual character of upamana more elaborately. He states that the view of the opponent is based upon considering the perception of similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow as a kāraṇa in upamāna. Here, the opponent ignores the fact that the perception of the mediate fact does not turn the correct means to perception. The case is analogous which is regarded as an independent means of knowledge, though the mediate fact is an object of perception. The perception of smoke in a hill leads to the inferential knowledge of the unperceived fire. Similarly, the perception of gavaya gives



rise to the knowledge of denotative relation (तद्धीन्द्रियजन्यमपि

धूमज्ञानमिव तदगोचरप्रमेयप्रमितिसाधनात्प्रमाणान्तरम् ।)

Moreover, the scope of upamāna is not covered by perception. In the case of perception the stress is laid upon the knowledge of an object while upamāna gives rise to the knowledge of denotative relation in an object which was not perceived earlier, (प्रत्यक्षं

तावदेवैतद्विषये न कृतश्रमम् । वनस्थगवयाकारपरिच्छेदफलं हि तत् ॥)

In the process of perception the contact of the self with the mind, mind with the sense-organs and the sense-organs with the objects are involved. But in the case of upamiti, the remembrance of the authoritative statement and the sadrsyajnana of the cow are needed. So it is not correct the opinion of the opponents that the upamāna can be included in perception. Udayana adds that the purpose of upamāna, viz. the cognition of the denotative relation, cannot be served

by perception because otherwise there would arise the undesirable contingency of such a cognition even in the person who has not heard the authoritative statement earlier.

नापि प्रत्यक्षफलम् अश्रुतवाक्यस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् ।ⁱ

ⁱ N.Ku. P.No. 334.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANUMITI AND UPAMITI

Some systematists like Cārvakas, Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikās, Bhāsarvanjña and Sāmkhyās do not admit upamāna as a separate means of valid knowledge.

According to the Vaiśeṣikās perception and inference are the only two means of valid knowledge. They do not recognize verbal testimony and comparison as a separate means of valid knowledge. According to them these two pramanas are only as forms of inference. But Naiyāyikās stand is that it is not correct for verbal comprehension and comparison take place even without the knowledge of invariable concomitance. But in Anumiti, the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Bauddhās Vaiśeṣikās etc. do not prepared to allot an independent status to upamāna etc. Therefore they include upamāna and śabda in the other pramāṇās accepted by them.

In a thorough examination we can understand the difference between anumiti and upamiti. Anumiti arises after the parāmarśa. The Parāmarśa is combined knowledge of Vyāpti or invariable concomitance and pakṣadharmata. The knowledge of Vyāpti arises with the help of Pratyakṣa or perception. The knowledge of Vyāpti is the relation between probans and probandum. When one perceives the probans in such and such place, the knowledge of probandum arises. For probans and probandum are connected. After the remembrance of invariable con-committance the combined knowledge viz. parāmarśa takes place and then the knowledge of probandum on the pakṣa occurs. This knowledge is inference. Annambhatta says that परामर्शजन्यज्ञानम् अनुमितिः। व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः।

The invariable concomitance between sādhyā and sādhanā is called vyāpti. When one infer fire on the mountain by seeing the smoke there, the Sādhyā is fire and smoke is the sādhanā and

mountain is the pakṣa. Sādhya is vyāpaka and sādhana is vyāpya
i.e वद्विव्याप्यो धूमः धूमव्यापको वद्विः are quite common. अधिकदेशे
विद्यमानधर्मः व्यापकः । अल्पदेशे विद्यमानधर्मः व्याप्यः । By a Vyapya or
existing comparatively in lesser substratums a Vyāpaka is
inferred . In other words Vyāpya is inferring and Vyāpakā is
inferred.

By keeping to the general form of vyāpti “wherever
there is smoke there is fire”, it should not be different to keep
the vyāpya and vyāpaka. We have already understood the
vyāpti from the kitchen. Here the smoke is the reason or
hetu to infer the fire and which is very necessary to infer the
fire in the pakṣa. Hētu is also called līnga.

In the absence of the vyāptijñāna, we cannot infer the
sādhya, hence vyāptijñāna is the important cause for anumiti.
After grasping the vyāpti from the kitchen a person going to

the hill sees the smoke and recollected the vyapti. Here the person can have the knowledge of the smoke in the hill with his eyes .i.e. the knowledge of the vyapya in the paksa is पक्षधर्मताज्ञानम् । Then the knowledge originates as वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वतः ।

This is called paramasa or subsumptive reflection remembering the vyapti he realizes the occurrence of the hetu which is *Vyaptivisista* on the subject viz. mountain. Hence परामर्श is विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि and it is the cause of anumiti.

The विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शः because अयं पर्वतः वह्निमान् इत्यनुमितिं प्रति व्याप्तिविशिष्टधूमस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वज्ञानमावश्यकम्।

subsumptive reflection is the final cause of the inference. Upamiti is the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object denoted by it. A person knows the cow well but he never had seen gavaya. A forester, who has seen a gavaya, tells him that the gavaya resembles the cow

casuals the person goes to the forest and happens to an animal which remember the cow. This leads to the recollection of what previously heard from the forester. He then comes to the conclusion that the animal before him is called gavaya i.e. denoted by the word gavaya. This knowledge is called upamiti and upamana is the instrument thereof. Here there isn't any kind of the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

Upamana is regard as a separate pramana because by it we can apprehend the relation of the word and the thing. This is with the help of resemblance became of another thing. The following factors are needed to make the upamitijnana :- the authoritative statement, the indirect knowledge of similarity, the recollection of the sense of the authoritative statement and the resultant knowledge. From the authoritative statement of the forester the urban man realizes the gavaya resembles the cow. Then he goes to the forest

and there also he sees the animal like cow and remembers the words of the forester. Finally he understands the animal in front of him is gavaya i.e, upamiti. The sādr̥syajñāna between the cow and gavaya is helped the person to understand the new animal in the forest. So sādr̥syajñāna is the kāraṇa for upamiti. उपमानेन गवये गवयशब्दशक्तिर्गृह्यते न च अनुमानं शक्तिग्राहकं भवति ।

गवयसादृश्यं च गोनिष्ठं गोदर्शनकाले ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते ।

Here the relation of one word to the thing is known and that also through the knowledge of comparison.

There are various methods to know the relation of word and its meaning. Upamāna is one among those. So there is vivid distinctness between upamāna and anumāna. Anumithi the knowledge of probandum is generated by the knowledge of the invariable committance of the probans. In upamithi there isn't ~~vyāptihōma~~ and in anumithi there isn't

Spelt

sadṛsyajñāna. The result of anumithi is the knowledge of sādhyā and that of upamiti is the knowledge of the relation of word and its meaning.

One difference between anumāna and upamāna is that by upamāna, the hearer benefits. As far as the inference is concerned, it originates without the help of others also. In the case of upamāna knowledge is derived through the knowledge of likeness but in the case of inference knowledge of invariable concomitance (Vyāptijñāna) is indispensable. Moreover in the case of knowledge derived through upamāna there is in us a self consciousness of the form, "I compare", but not of the form I infer". Upamāna is always stated in the form "asso", by means of which the common property constituting resemblance is expressed, e.g. 'as the cow so the gavaya'. The संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानम् is the important part in the upamiti. In short sadṛsyajñāna is the cause for upamiti and vyāptijñāna is the cause for anumiti. So we can say that

anumiti and upamiti are two different valid knowledge and these are the result of anumāna and upamāna pramāṇa. According to the Naiyayikās the sole sphere of upamāna is the connection between the name and the object. Moreover the sadṛśyajñāna, *Atideśavakyarthasmarāṇa* also is needed to make upamitijñāna. But in the case of anumiti *atideśavākṛtyarthasmarāṇa* is not needed. The Naiyayikās have no difficulty to establish it as a distinct pramāṇa and they strongly criticise the view that Upamāna is included under, inference.

Some says that the knowledge of the signification of the word *bos-gavaeus* is derived through perception. This is not correct, though the relation between the word *bos-gavaeus* and the animal called *bos-gavaeus* may be perceived in a particular case with which our eyes are in union, it is impossible to perceive such a relation. In other case which are beyond our eyes. Therefore the knowledge

of signification of the word *bos-gavaeus* is not derived through the knowledge of perception, but through the knowledge of *upamāna*. From this we can understand that the knowledge of the unknown animal *gavaya* is grasped through the *sādryajñāna*.

Jayantabhatta rejects the perceptual character of *upamāna*. He says that the opinion of the opponent is based upon considering the perception of similarity which the *gavaya* bears to the cow as a *kāraṇa* in *upamāna*.

The perception of the smoke in a hill leads to the inferential knowledge of the unperceived fire while the perception of *gavaya* gives rise to the knowledge of the denotative relation.

Another particularity of *upamana* is that the power of denotation or *vācyavācakaśakti*, is this beyond the senses

and it is the result of upamāna. When a person hear the authoritative statement i.e. as the cow so the gavaya, he could not understand the object gavaya. After this he goes to the forest and there he sees the animal like cow and he realize the fact that the particular word gavaya denotes particular object viz.gavaya.

According to Kumarilabhatta this type of knowledge is also a remembrance. This objection is not correct. It is not remembranceⁱⁱ, for at the time when the cow was seen the gavaya was not seen, and hence the similarity was not seen. What was not seen cannot be remembered. So upamāna is regarded as a separate pramāṇa, because by it we can apprehended the similarity existing in a thing.

Another difference between anumiti and upamiti is that, when we realize the hill is fiery, and the kitchen is fiery, we

ⁱⁱ Upamana in Indian Philosophy P.No. 25.

infer the relation between the fire and the smoke because we could understand the relation between the smoke and fire in many places. There is no need of *sādrśyajñāna* to infer the *sadhya* after seeing the *hetu* in *pakṣa*. Therefore we can understand that the *anumiti* and *upamiti* are different type of knowledge to make *anumiti* and *upamiti* *vyāptijñāna* and *sādrśyajñāna* are very needed. सम्बन्धस्य परिच्छेदः संज्ञायाः संज्ञिना सह । प्रत्यक्षादेरसाध्यत्वादुपमानफलं विदुः ।ⁱⁱⁱ

(The clear-cut knowledge of the relation of a name with the thing named is the result of comparison, as it cannot be produced by perception etc.)

According to the *Nayāyikas* *upamāna* is a distinct means of valid knowledge because the knowledge produced by *sādrśyajñāna* cannot be produced by any other means of knowledge. The knowledge of the connection of the name with the thing named is the result of *upamāna*. This cannot

Spelling ✓

ⁱⁱⁱ Kusumanjali – Karika –10.

arise from perception etc. Thus the knowledge or ascertainment of the connection i.e., the power of meaning, of the name is gavaya, with the thing named i.e., the animal distinguished by the species gavaya, can be attained only through upamana. Hearing the statement that 'gavaya is like a cow' a villager may come across a cow – like animal in the forest. Then he recalls the meaning of the statement 'gavaya is like a cow' and concludes that this is what is meant by the word gavaya. The knowledge does not arise merely from the statement, because in that case knowledge may arise even when gavaya was not perceived. Nor does the knowledge arise from the mere perception of gavaya. If it were so a person, a person who has not heard the statement 'gavaya is like a cow' would also come to know what is meant by the word gavaya when he perceives gavaya. Nor can it be said that this knowledge result from the statement 'gavaya is like a cow' together with the perception of gavaya. The time of

hearing the authoritative statement and the time of perceiving gavaya being different, both cannot take place together. Again, meaning of the statement may be remembered even when the statement is forgotten. It is not proper to say that the knowledge 'this is what is meant by the word gavaya' arises from the perception of gavaya aided by the remembrance of the meaning of the statement. For the knowledge does not arise even when gavaya is perceived unless one perceives in gavaya similarity with a cow. Therefore upamāna must be admitted in order to give rise to the knowledge of similarity as which is based the knowledge, viz. "this is what is meant by the word gavaya".

The Vaiśeṣika's view is that the upamāna can be attained through inference. This position is not accepted by Naiyāyikas. Udayana answers this objection: -

सादृश्यस्यानिमित्तत्वात्रिमित्तस्याप्रतीतितः । समयो दुर्ग्रहः पूर्वं शब्देनानुमयापि वा ॥

Likeness is not being the ground (for the use of the term gavaya) the ground being not known, the relation between the name and the thing named cannot be known earlier by the statement or by inference) This word gavaya stands for a cow like animal cannot be known from the statement the ground for the use of the term gavaya determined first. It may be either gosadrasya or gavayatva. If likeness to cow were the ground for the use of the term gavaya, then he cannot use the word gavaya as he lacks the knowledge that gavaya is like a cow. A villager who has not seen a gavaya cannot learn immediately after hearing the statement that gavayatva is the ground for the use of the term gavaya.

It may be concluded that the knowledge in general that the word gavaya stands for an animal that is like a cow arises earlier from hearing the statement. Only the desire to know specifically which cow-like animal is signified the word

gavaya is satisfied by such knowledge as 'gavaya' is signified by the word 'gavaya'. This knowledge is generated by upamana, it does not result from the statement. Again, the knowledge that gavaya stands for the word gavaya cannot be attained by inference. Inference may give rise to the knowledge that the word gavaya signifies a cow-like animal, but the knowledge that gavaya stands for the word gavaya cannot be attained by inference. Inference may give rise to the knowledge that the word gavaya signifies a cow-like animal, but the knowledge that gavaya is signified by the word gavaya cannot be produced by inference. Therefore upamana must be admitted as a distinct pramāṇa to give rise to this knowledge. Another difference between anumiti and upamiti anumiti is of two types i.e. svarthanumana and parārthanumāna. The upamiti does not include in svārthanumāna and pararthanumāna. This svārthanumāna is one's own experience i.e. after seeing the smoke in

kitchen, then fire is inferred. But for the parārthānumāna pancavayava-vakya is needed. The pratijna, Hetu, udaharana, upanaya and nigamama are the pancavayavas. So we can clear that the upamiti does not included in anumiti. Moreover if the upamāna included under inference we can say that यत्र यत्र गौः तत्र तत्र गवयः like यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र तत्र वह्निः। इति।

* Frank

Another difference between anumiti and upamiti is that :- in the case of anumiti a person cannot infer the object without the knowledge of the vyaptijñāna, but in the case of upamiti a person perceives an object through the well known similarity of an object i.e, प्रत्यक्षेण अप्रत्यक्षसिद्धे :। In the process of upamāna the proposition is made by a person who knows both the members of similarity therefore it is not a case of inference. In comparison we draw a conclusion about one

perceived thing on the basis of another perceived thing. परार्थं
चोपमानम् , यस्य ह्युपमेयमप्रसिद्धं तदर्थं प्रसिद्धोभयेन क्रियते इति ।

Some opponent say that upamāna doesn't differ from inference, for both seek to establish unperceived by means of the perceived. Answer to the objection is that the matter of comparison is similarity, The bos-gavaeus in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is on perceiving a bos-gavaeus we notice its similarity to a cow. Hence comparison supplied us with knowledge of a perceived thing through its similarity to another thing also perceived. This characteristic distinguishes it from inference which furnishes us with knowledge of an unperceived thing through that of a thing perceived. Comparison is not identical with inference because the former is established through the compendious expression so, "as is a cow, so is a bos-gavaceus", this is an

instance of comparison. This use of 'so' makes it clear that comparison is a distinct means of right knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsakās also try to prove that it is not right to reject upamāna as an independent means of knowledge. The inference demands invariable concomitance and probans in the pakṣa. The absence of any of these conditions turns the syllogism into a fallacious reasoning. The probans should have a universal relation with the probandum and must be extent at the place of proving it. Without these qualities the probans will turn into an apparent probans (hētvābhāsa). Here the similarity cannot be the proban. The similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow also cannot serve as a probans because firstly being perceived in the gavaya it is not related to the cow while the probandum must be related to the pakṣa, secondly it serves

as a part of the probandum itself. It would be absurd to say that the probandum proves a probandum^{iv}.

The inference depends upon the notion of non-conditioned invariable concomitance of the two objects which is again formed by repeated perception of the two together. In the case of upamāna this factor is not necessary. The similarity is not such a relation cognized repeatedly. The person who has seen the cow once only and then only once the gavaya in the forest, the idea of similarity is produced simultaneously with the perception of gavaya. The probans in the case of inference needs its non-existence in the objects dissimilar to the probandum. For example the smoke, as a probans in the inference of fire requires its absence in the objects other than fire. In the case of upamāna, this condition is not needed for the supposed

^{iv} Upamana in Indian Philosophy P.No.88.

probans^v. In the case of inference the proban lead to the inferential knowledge of the probandum situated at the same place. For example, the knowledge of the smoke and fire at the same locus. But upamāna produces the knowledge of the object situated at same other place, i.e., the person (villager) sees the cow in the town and the gavaya in the forest.

The causal conditions leading to upamāna are different from those leading to inference. The cause of inference is the remembrance of the rule or nature of relation between the probans and the probandum and there is no attempt for its ascertainment. But in the case of upamāna the relation is yet to be ascertained. Here the cause is gavaya endowed with

^v Upamana in Indian Philosophy P.No.90.

the dominance of similarity with reference to the components
and thus, looks only like similar.^{vi}

^{vi} Upamana in Indian Philosophy P.No.91.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UPAMITI AND SĀBDABODHA.

Some systematists like prasastapāda and
Spe^r Bhāsarvanjña include upamāna under verbal testimony.
According to Bhasarvanjña it contains verbal testimony^{vii}
because it depends of upon the authoritative statement. He
says that Goutama does not intend to establish upamāna an
independent means of knowledge but mentions it for its
serviceableness to prove the validity of verbal testimony.
(शब्दप्रमाणसमर्थनार्थं प्रयोजनम् ।).

The Naiyāyikās prove that upamiti is different from
sābdabodha. Vacaspati Misra tries to prove the difference
between upamāna and verbal testimony. He rejects the
objection that the upamāna included in the authoritative

^{vii} Upamana in Indian Philosophy P.No.43.

statement. According to him the verbal testimony cannot lead us to the knowledge of denotative relation. The main difference between upamiti and śābdabōdha is that for making śābdabōdha padaganya padārthajñāna is needed but in the case of upamiti Sadṛsyajñāna is needed.

After hearing the authoritative statement of the forester, person desires to know the unknown object. Here through the śābdabōdha a person could not understand the unknown object (gavaya). So it is very clear that the merely authoritative statement doesn't lead us to the knowledge of denotative relation. The denotative relation is the chief aim in upamiti. But in the case of upamiti through Sadṛsyajñāna a person understand the unknown object gavaya. The denotative relation gives us the knowledge of an object of its own class and those of other classes.

Jayantabhaṭṭa refutes the view stating that upamāna is included under śābdabodha. Upamāna as a separate means of valid knowledge he discusses the difference between the upamāna and śābda. He states that the totality of cause is not the same in both cases. The verbal testimony operates through the verbal understanding or the validity of knowledge of the speaker. The upamāna, requires the additional factor of other means i.e., well-known similarity. It would have very well been included under verbal testimony if the forest dweller would not have instructed the city-dweller desires of knowing the gavaya about the similarity to the well known object which sense as a means of knowing the gavaya. This case is analogous because, here also the knower known the object through the well known similarity and not merely through the words. The pramāta understands the well-known similarity through the authoritative statement and knows. There by the named – name connection. So we can

understand that merely the authoritative statement is not effective for upamiti. But it is the understanding of the well-known similarity that the reliable person convey which leads to the knowledge of the denotative relation :- (प्रतिपत्तापि नागरिको नारण्यवाक्यादेव तं प्राणिनं गवयशब्दवाच्यतया बुध्यते किन्तु सारूप्यं प्रसिद्धेन गवा तस्य पश्यति ।)^{४८८}

The knowledge of denotative relation cannot be originated by the statement of the forest dweller only, for the gavaya is not present at the time of instruction given by the forest-dweller and the knowledge of such a relation is possible when both the name and its denotation are known and not otherwise.

आगमादपि तत्प्रसिद्धिर्न वनेचरभाषितात् । तत्कालं संज्ञिनो नास्ति गवयस्य हि दर्शनम् ।

संज्ञासंज्ञिनोश्च परिच्छेदे सति तत्संबन्धः सुशको भवति नान्यथा । when hearing the authoritative statement only a person cannot understand the unknown object gavaya because it depends

^{viii} N.M. Part I. P.No.128-129.

upon perception for finishing the expressed senses. Hence the verbal testimony gives the incomplete picture of the object. It may be argued here that the authoritative statement conveys the denotative relation with the class and it is verified through the perception of the individual object. This will however not disprove the position of the Naiyāyikas since the class is not definitely known without perceiving an individual.

Udayana again says that, if the resultant knowledge through upamāna is considered to be a case of verbal testimony, such a knowledge would be admitted as arising in a person who has heard the authoritative statement but has not perceived the gavaya (सेयं न तावत् वाक्यमात्रफलम् अनुपलब्धपिण्डस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् ।)^{ix}

^{ix} N.M. Part I. P.No 129.

Moreover, the similarity to the cow is not a cause of usage of the word gavaya in the sense of the animal gavaya. Otherwise, the denotation of the word gavaya would not be known by the people who do not know the cow. Hence, the similarity conveyed through the authoritative statement does not sense as a cause to know the denotative relation between the word gavaya and the animal gavaya. Udayana tries to clear that the upamāna is not the combination of the perception and verbal testimony. In the case of upamāna the authoritative statement and the perception of the object is leaded to the denotative relation. It is the important factor in upamāna. The authoritative statement is heard earlier and the perception of the object takes place afterwards. However the objects which produce the effect together should operate and should be present at the same time in producing the effect.

If the similarity of the cow is not a cause of upamiti, the samjñāsamjñisambandajñāna of the gavaya would not be known by the people who do not know the cow. So the authoritative statement does not obey as a cause to know the denotative relation between the word gavaya and the animal gavaya. (न हि गवयशब्दस्य सादृश्यं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् अप्रतीतगुणामव्यवहारप्रसङ्गात् ।)^x

^x N.Ku. P.No.33.

CHAPTER - IV

The different opinions of old and
new logicians in the process
and Nature of Upamiti.

According to Viswanāthapanānana the cognition that the body which is seen in front resembling that of a cow is gavaya is not upamiti. But the cognition that gavaya is indicated by the word gavaya is upamiti otherwise the experience aroused by the sight of another gavaya will not be upamāna in all such cases it should be called upamiti and that is demerit. In all cases when a gavaya is seen, neither remembering of the Atidesavakyārtha occurs nor the knowledge of similarity occurs. Therefore the knowledge that 'gavaya' is noted by the word gavaya is 'upamiti' but the

knowledge that the one seen in front is a gavaya cannot be upamiti.ⁱ

Grāmīnasya Prathamātah Paśyato gavayadikam.

Sādrśyādhirgavadinām ya syaṅsa karanam matam.

Vāk्यarthasyatideśasya smṛtivyāpara ucyate

Gavayadipadanam tu saktidhirupamāphalam."ⁱⁱ

Modern logicians opine that the grasping of similarity in gavaya and the perception of similarity is the instrument of upamiti. The prācīnanaiyāyikās say that atideśavāk्यarthasābdabodhah is karaṇa, remembering of the authoritative statement is the operative process and the sight of the object having similarity is the auxiliary cause or saha-karikāraṇa.

ⁱ Upamananirutanam in Nyayasiddhanta Mukthavali P.No.352.

ⁱⁱ Mukthavali – Karika P.No.70..

*Vedantisca sādṛśyajñanopamānapramānam swīkurvanti,
Naiyāyikāstu śaktigrahaprayojanāya.*

Analogy or upamāna is accepted by Mīmāṃsa in a sense which is entirely different from that in Nyāya took it. The man who has seen a cow goes to the forest and sees a wild ox and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya in the cow. Then he cognizes the similarity of the gavaya in the cow as it follows directly from the perception of the similarity of the cow in the gavaya is called upamāna. According to the Mīmāṃsakās the knowledge that 'this gavaya is similar to the cow is similar to this animal gavaya is upamiti. But the Naiyāyikas believe that the upamiti is the relation between the word and its denotation.

Naiyāyikās, Mīmāṃsākas, and vedāntins admit upamāna as a distinct means of valid knowledge, but

Repetitive

Bauddha and vaishesika do not accept it as a distinct means of valid knowledge. They regarded upamana included in inference. The Naiyayikas reject this opinion. According to them assimilative analogy can be treated as inference only where it is expressed in the Nyaya-vakya as cited below.

Frank

"Gavaya is similar to a cow". The invariable con-committance in this Nyaya vakya is not true. Not only that, the knowledge of the relation existing, between a name and the object denoted by it is possible even without the invariable-con committance. In analogy there is no inferential knowledge only, but recognising similarity. So assimilative analogy can not be included in inference. Moreover the upamana existing for Vastvarthajnana of a word, hence there is no need of Vyaptijnana. According to the Bauddhas upamana is the combination of perception and sabda. They regarded similarity of two things and the Vastvarthajnana are

the two factors of upamāna. In these factors the forever is known through the pratyakṣa pramāṇa and latter is known through the Śabdapramāṇa. The Naiyāyikās reply to this objection that through the upamāna pramāṇa we can understand, not only the similarity of the two things but also the two objects are included in the same species.

It is said that there is some relationship between assimilative analogy and the analogy of the western logic. In analogy with some similarities of the two objects, more similarities are inferred. For example, the planet earth and Mars have similarities, as both revolves round the sun, both rotates on their own axis, both receives light from the sun etc. from these similarities, some other things also could be in common is inferred, i.e., there is living beings in Mars also. From this it is understood that analogy and assimilative analogy (Sāmānyanumāna) is possible only with recognizing similarity.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsakās accepts upamāna as an independent means of knowledge Jainini the author of the Mīmāṃsasūtrās does not speak of upamāna. But śabara discusses the nature of upamāna. Śabara's opinion is commented on by prabhakara and kumārila, who were the two opponents of two schools of Mīmāṃsa. There is a minor difference between kumarila and prabhakara about the upamāna. According to prabhakara similarity is an independent category, while kumarila considers it as the assemblage (collection) of upamāna is that :-
"Upamānamapim sādṛśyamasannikṛṣṣte arthe" *Buddhi mutpadayati* (upamana is the similarity which brings about the cognition of an object not in contact with the senses). He assesses the same term for the means of knowledge and the resultant knowledge. He has expressed and the resultant knowledge. He has expressed it with the help of an example 'just as the perception of gavaya is the cause of the

Spelling

Cap
Cap^u

remembrance of the cow". *Yatha gavayadarsanam gosmaranasya* Kumarilabhatta states that the object of upamāna is the cognition of a thing remembered as qualified by its similarity to the perceived object or the similarity as qualified by the previously known object *Tasmad yat smaryate tat syat sādṛśyena viśeṣitam Prameyamupamānasya sādṛśyam va tadanvitam*. A person who has seen the cow but has never seen the gavaya goes to the forest and happens to see a gavaya there. He cognizes through the perception of gavaya its similarity to the cow. Then, he recalls to his mind the formerly perceived cow as similar to the gavaya perceived at that time. The cow which is remembered and is presently known as qualified by its similarity to the gavaya is the object known through upamāna.

Narayana defines upamiti and clarifies the opinion of instrumentality and the resultant knowledge of upamāna. The knowledge of similarity which is the resultant knowledge. *Gavayasthitasādrśyadarsanam karaṇam bhavet. Phalam gogatasadrśyajnamiyavagamyatam.* Prabhakara also understands similarity as the means of upamāna. The mīmāṃsa view of the resultant knowledge through upamāna amounts to a case of memory consequently the resultant knowledge would not be valid. "*Bhavatu vaiṣa buddhistena sādṛśi gauriti tathap'smṛitivanna pramanaphalam.*

Jayatirtha states that the mimamsakas accept three kinds of upamana :-

1. the means of knowing similarity which the directly perceived object bears to the remembered object.
2. the means of knowing the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one and

3. when the faultless statements leads to the knowledge of similarity.

The advaita school of uttaramīmāṃsa accept means of knowledge and gives an independent status to upamāna. Anandapūrṇa defines upamiti as the knowledge of similarity which the object situated at a distance bears to that present near the observer. *Sannikṛṣṭenasannikṛstasya sādṛśyamiti upamitiḥ* which explaining the psychological process in upamāna Ānandapurna states that the resultant knowledge through upamāna refers to the cow qualified by the similarity to gavaya. *Sādṛśyavisistagojnanamupamiti* Darmaśāstra defines upamāna as the karana of upamiti which in turn is the resultant knowledge in the form of similarity, *Tatrasādṛśyatramakaranamupamānam* He explains the position with the help of the following example :- when a person perceives a cow in the village and comes across a gavaya in the forest, then he comes to understand that the

object perceived is like the cow. After this, he reaches the ascertainment that my cow is like the object perceived and thus, arises the knowledge of cow as qualified by its similarity to the gavaya. Here the means of upamiti is the knowledge of perception of the gavaya and the resultant knowledge is that of the cow as qualified by its similarity to the gavaya. According to Darma^Uraja Advaya^Ues the instrumentality is the knowledge of similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow and the resultant knowledge is the knowledge of similarity which the cow bears to the gavaya. “*Tatra anvayavyatirekabhyām gavayanisthagosadrsyajnanam karanam gonista gavayasādrśyajñām phalam.*”

Bhasarvanjña does not accept upamāna as a separate means of valid knowledge. He holds that neither the nature of the means nor that of the resultant knowledge process upamāna as an independent means of knowledge.

The systems of the Nyāya to pūrvamīmāṃsa and the Advaita school of uttaramīmāṃsa admit upamāna as an independent means of knowledge, but they possess difference of opinion about the details of upamāna. The Naiyāyikās are on one side and the pūrvamīmāṃsakās and the advaita vedantins are as the other. The main difference is regarding the nature of the resultant knowledge through upamāna. According to the Naiyāyikas it refers to the denotative relation between the word and the object of a certain class, while according to the pūrvamīmāṃsakās and the advaita vedantins it refers to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one. It further leads to the difference regarding the object of upamāna which is the denotative relation according to the Naiyāyikas, and the remembered object qualified by similarity according to the pūrvamīmāṃsakas and the Advaita vedantins. Moreover the Naiyāyikas lay more stress

Spelling

on the authoritative statement while the mīmāṃsakas do not take it as essential for upamāna. There is only a minor difference between the views of the Prabhakara and Bhatta school of the pūrvamīmāṃsa. Prabhakaras, unlike the Bhattas consider similarity as an independent category.

A study of the view of the critics of upamāna reveals that except the cārvaka and a few other philosophers who reduce it to the non-valid source of knowledge like smṛti no thinker rejects the validity of the process of upamāna as leading to the valid knowledge. They however reject the independent status of upamāna as a means of knowledge. They are in favour of including it under some of the other means of knowledge. The different systematists include it under different means of knowledge. As regards the nyāya view, Bhāsarvajña includes it under verbal testimony or inference, Gaudapada under verbal testimony and Jayamangala under verbal testimony or inference. The

sāṃkyacandrika and vijñānabhikṣu under inference.

Amongst the Buddhist, Dinnāga includes it under perception or verbal testimony, santaraksita under memory or inference.

Spelt

The jaina logicians include it under recognition. Amongst the Uṭṭaramīmāṃsākās, Vedāntadeśika favours its inclusion under verbal testimony. Meghanadasūri under recognition, Srinivasavadāsa under any of the perception. Inference or verbal testimony and Jayatīrtha includes it under perception.

The samkhyās include it under perception and the Buddhists under remembrance. The jaina logicians include it under recognition. Puruṣotama under mental perception and Mukunda reduces it to either of the perception and valid testimony.

CHAPTER – V

THE EFFECT OF UPAMĀNA

Goutama is concerned that Pramāṇa was always in the form of knowledge, and he did not differentiate between Pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala. In Nyāyabhāṣya vātsyayana gives a vague idea of the differentiation between Pramāṇa and prama. The Buddhists also considered, a Pramana is always in the form of knowledge, and there is no difference between Pramāṇa and its resultant knowledge. Jayanta maintains the difference between the two one being the 'means' and the other the resultant knowledge. Thus the means of perception is pratyakṣa Pramāṇa while the resultant knowledge is pratyakṣa prama. Similarly, the means of inference is different from the resultant inferential knowledge. In the case of Anumāna there are two words anumāna and anumiti, the former in the sense of the means and the latter in the sense of the inferential knowledge. But in the case of perception the same word pratyakṣa signifies both the means of knowledge and the resultant knowledge. According to later manuals of the Nyāya vaiśeṣikās school, when an indeterminate perception is taken as the resultant knowledge (pramaphala), the sense (indriya) is held to be Pramāṇa, the sense-object-contact being regarded as operation

(vyapara) i.e. the intermediary process between an instrument and its result. Similarly, when a determinate perception is taken as the resultant, the sense object contact is regarded as the means and the indeterminate perception as the intermediary operation. In both these cases, the Pramana i.e. the sense or the sense object contact is in the form of knowledge. But when volition to accept or to reject an object or to be indifferent to it (hanopadanaopeksabuddhi) is the resultant knowledge, the Pramāṇa is in the form of indeterminate perception, the determinate perception being the intermediary operation. Prasastapāda also differentiated between Pramāṇa and prama, but he never regarded anything other than knowledge as Pramana. He points out that mere apprehension of the nature (svarupalocana-matra) of particular universals (samānyaviśeṣya) is the Pramāṇa and the perception of substance etc is the prama.

CHAPTER - VI

The necessity of accepting upamāna
as a separate pramāna
according to the Nyāya philosophy.

Upamāna is an independent means of knowledge in the system of Nyāya, Pūrvaṃimāmsa and the Advaita school of Uṭṭaramimāmsa. Some systematists like Ārvakas, Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikās, Basarvajña and Samkhyas rejected upamāna as a distinct means of valid knowledge. The upholders of upamāna as an independent means of valid knowledge also differ in details. There is a difference of opinion among the pūrvaṃimāmsakās, Vedāntins and the Naiyāyikas about the resultant knowledge or upamitis.

UPAMĀNA

Among the four means of valid knowledge in Nyāya philosophy upamāna is regarded as the third. It is derived from the word upa and māna. Upa means similarity and mana means knowledge. So the literary meaning of the word upamāna is the knowledge of the similarity of two things.

Upamāna is commonly rendered as analogy in English. In Tarkasamgraha Annambhatta defines upamiti karanam upamānam. Samjna Samjni (गोसदृशोगवयः।)

sambandhajnanam upamiti, i.e., the relation between a name and the object denoted by it. The following factors are needed in the process of upamāna :- the authoritative statement, the indirect knowledge of similarity, the recollection of the authoritative statement, and resultant knowledge or upamiti, Goutama's definition of upamāna is that "prasiddha sādharmyāt sādhyā sādhanam upamānam".✓

Vātsyayana explains this definition of upamāna which makes known what is to be made known, from similarity with an object that is already well known. Naiyāyikās famous example of upamāna is as the cow so the gavaya' (गोसदृशो गवयः ।) i.e., the animal called gavaya is just like a cow. A person who is ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya, goes to the forest and asks the forester what is gavaya ? From the forester he learns that the gavaya is similar to a cow. After hearing the words of the forester he knows that there is a relation between these two animals. On some future occasion when he happens to see the gavaya he recollects the instructive assertion of the forester and perceives the similarity with the cow in gavaya. Here the sādṛśyanjana of the cow which helps the townsman to understand the unknown animal gavaya. So the sādṛśyanjana is the karaṇa or instrument for such a cognition. By this sādṛśyanjana the townsman knows the

animal before him is gavaya i.e., denoted by the word gavaya. This knowledge is called upamiti, and upamāna is the instrument of upamiti. Here the remembrance of the meaning of words of the forester (the authoritative statement) is the vyāpara or intercourse for making upamiti. The upamiti¹ajñāna is the result of upamāna and it is not ascertained by other pramāṇas.

There is a difference of opinion among the Naiyāyikās about the karana or the cause of upamiti. According to the Pracina Naiyayikas

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थशाब्दबोधः करणम् , ✓

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारम् , गोसादृश्यदर्शनं सहकारिकारणम् । ३

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणम् Navinanaityayikas says that ✓

आगमाद्विसंस्कारस्मृत्यपेक्षं सारूप्यज्ञानमुपमानम् ।

is the mediate activity or vayapara and sādr̥syānjnana is karana. Annambhatta accepts the opinion of Navinanaityayikas. If we accept the Pracina²naityayikas

opinion there will be no upamiti. Hence the sādryanjnana is an important cause of upamiti and the authoritative statement, the recollection of the authoritative statement are needed to complete this idea. So we can understand the opinion of Navīnanaiyāyikas are suitable to make upamiti. On the other hand we accept at the pracinanaiyayikas opinion i.e., vākhyartha śābdabodha as a karaṇa there is no upamiti originates.

Goutama's definition of upamāna does not give any explanations what he really intends as the purpose of upamāna vātsyayana is the first commentator who clarifies the idea of the utility of upamāna. He gives another example for upamāna, a person asked by the doctor to bring the medicinal herbs called Mudgaparṇi (a kind of herb) and māṣaparṇi (another kind of herb) and is told that Mudgaparṇi is like mudga and māṣaparṇi is like māṣa. After the propositions he goes to the forest to collect medicines and

acquires the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object. Such analogies are of great practical value in every day life and many other things are known through upamāna. So upamāna is an efficient instrument of valid knowledge and so it should be regarded as a separate pramāna.

Goutama's definition of pramāna is very difficult to understand what he really considers as the nature of pramāna. He is not strict about the differentiation into means of knowledge and the resultant knowledge. He takes the perception as a resultant knowledge and verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. In the case of upamāna he takes it as a means of knowledge i.e., "Prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānām". The word sādhyasādhana can be interpreted into two ways viz, the means of establishing (Pramāna) and the result of establishing

(pramiti). If the earlier interpretation is accepted, the word upamana will mean a means of knowledge and the term prasiddha sādharmyāt becomes the basis for the words denoting means in the sutra. This prasiddha sādharmyāt also regarded as a sādhana because through which we can get the knowledge of an object.

The sūtrakara does not state anything about the nature of resultant knowledge or upamiti. But Bhāṣyakāra gives a clearcut idea about the upamiti. His statement is that the purpose of upamāna is the knowledge of the relation of the corresponding object.

Uddyotakara connects the authoritative statement and knowledge of similarity. He says that the mere knowledge of similarity cannot lead to the knowledge of the relation of the name with a particular class of objects. One does not know the name of an object when he saw a thing, but when he

understands the similarity of the thing with another well known object and recollecting the remembrance of the sentence spoken by the trust worthy person. Here the recollection of the authoritative statement helped the person to understand the name of the thing in front. According to him merely the knowledge of similarity of an object is not sufficient to grasp the name and its denotation.

Therefore Uddyotakara says that समाख्यसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्ति उपमानार्थ
इत्याह ।

In short the authoritative statement has an important role to make upamiti and the knowledge of similarity is leaded by the authoritative statement.

According to Uddyotakara knowledge of similarity is of two kinds, one originates from perception and another originates

through verbal testimony. The former knowledge occurs after perceiving the object directly and the latter originates through the authoritative statement. So he says that “प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादित्यत्र प्रसिद्धिरुभयी श्रुतमयी प्रत्यक्षमयी च । श्रुतमयी यथा गौरेव गवय इति । प्रत्यक्षमयी च गोसादृश्यविशिष्टो यमीदृशः पिण्ड इति । तत्र प्रत्यक्षमयी प्रसिद्धिरागमाहितस्मृत्यपेक्षा समाख्यसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः ।

Jayantabatta finds a difference of opinion among his predecessors about the nature of upamana. His predecessors are early Naiyayikas and contemporary Naiyāyikas. He presents the opinion of the early Naiyāyikas and contemporary Naiyāyikas. According to the early Naiyayikas upamana is the authoritative statement which enlightens the similarity of the unknown object bears to the known object.

This similarity aims at ascertaining the denotative relation between a name and its denotation. For instance an urban man who does not know the nature of gavaya asks a forest dweller what is the nature of gavaya. The forest dweller replies that 'as the cow so the gavaya', which the unknown object bears to the known object and it leads to the knowledge that the word denotes the gavaya class.

Like the early logicians the contemporary logicians also hold that upamāna produces the knowledge of the denotative relation. However they opined that the upamāna is the perceptual knowledge of the similarity which the unknown object bears to the well-known one. This according to them should be accepted as a separate means of cognition because it leads to the knowledge of some unknown object, though in itself it is cognized through the senses. A city dweller who has heard the authoritative statement wandered

in the forest and comes across an animal similar to the cow. Then he remembers the statement of the forester and comes to know that the animal is denoted by the word gavaya. In this way, the resultant knowledge of denotative relation is upamiti and the nearness cause of such a relation is called upamāna.

Uddyotakara explains the nature of upamāna in a different manner. According to him the term prasiddhasādharmya gives the object having well known similarity (Prasiddham sadharmyam yasya) or which has got the similarity with a well known object (Prasiddhena va sadharmyam yasya) through that upamiti arises. Like Vatsyayana Uddyotakara also considers the object of upamana as the knowledge of the name and its denotation. Here we can see a difference of opinion between Bhāṣya and Vārtika about the means of knowledge. Bhāṣyakara says

that the similarity is the Karaṇa, but vārtikakara considered perception of similarity as karaṇa. In Nyaya Bhāṣya the similarity is apprehended through the recollection of the authoritative statement, but vartikakara says that the similarity is directly perceived. Although there is a difference of opinion regarding the means of knowledge both of them recognized upamiti as the relation of the name with its denotation.

Goutama was aware of the difficulty as to which kind of similarity should be considered as well-known. He replies to the following objections to his concept of upamāna.

1. Here the opponent says that the similarity can be complete, preponderant, or slight and on the basis of such similarity upamāna cannot be established.
2. Upamāna consists in the establishment of apprehension by non-apprehension.

Goutama answers the two questions as follows :- The first objection is not valid, for upamāna is based upon well-known similarity. If similarity is complete there will be no upamāna. If the similarity is complete we can say that a cow is like a cow. No one says that a cow is like a cow. (यथा गौस्तथा गौः ।)

No upamāna will be based upon preponderant similarity, for no one asserts bull is like a buffalo. (यथा वृषभस्तथा महिषः ।)

Nor again can upamāna be based upon slight similarity (यथा गजः तथा गवयः) On these instances we can clear that the above mentioned objections are not correct. So upamāna is regarded as a separate means of valid knowledge. So where there is well known similarity there analogy should exist.

Uddyotakara answers the present objection in a different way. According to him the upamāna is quite

possible even in the three cases of resemblance mentioned by the objector. He says that we can get the knowledge of the perfect similarity through the two operation as the battle between 'Rama and Ravaṇa only'. Here the action is compared with itself. The result of upamāna is received through great similarity as the buffalo so the cow. The partial knowledge also leads to the knowledge through upamana. For instance, when one desires to know the nature of the existence of the mountain Meru. A person is told that as the existence of the mustard seed, so the existence of mountain Meru. Here the similarity between the mountain Meru and the grain of oil seed is very slight. Thus the similarity can establish in the above mentioned three cases.

Goutama and Vātsyayana regarded upamāna as of one kind i.e., based on similarity Uddyotakara introduces another basis of upamāna, viz, dissimilarity and Vācaspatimisra introduces characteristic also as the basis of upamāna. The

later texts of the Naiyāyikās maintain that upamāna is of three kinds, viz, Sādharmyopamāna (Upamāna through similarity) Vaidharmyopamāna (Upamāna through dissimilarity) and dharmamātropamāna (Upamāna through mere properties). The Sādharmyopamāna is the means of knowing through which we can get the knowledge of an unknown object. Here the unknown animal gavaya is known through sādharmyopamāna of the cow and the recollection of the authoritative statement. The Vaidharmyopamāna also the means of knowledge through the dissimilarity of a well known thing. For example a person asks a specialist about the nature of a horse, the replied that it does not have two hoofs like a cow. Then, when he saw the horse he recollects the above mentioned statement and understand the dissimilarity between the cow and the horse. In Nyāyasiddhantamukthavali we can see another illustration of dissimilarity when one asks about the form of earth the

specialist told him that it is different from water i.e., the earth is having dissimilar properties it becomes a case of knowledge of the denotative relation through dissimilarity. In dharmāmatropamāna we can get the cognition of an unknown object through the peculiar characteristic.

For example, Vacaspatimisra says that a Rhinocers has a single horn protruding from its nose, (खङ्गमृगो नासिकोद्गमदेकशृङ्गः) here the protruding nose is the peculiar characteristic of the Rhinocers and it differentiates the Rhinocers from other animals.

IMPORTANCE OF UPAMĀNA

Sādrśyajnana or similarity is the Karaṇa of Upamity. This sādrśyajnana has an important role in every day life, like the urban man understands the unknown animal gavaya through the sādrśyajnana of the cow. For example, a child who does not know about a thing can understand the

unknown object when we give an explanation about the thing i.e., the name and the particularity of the object, we can give many examples of this kind. A person who does not know the animal sheep, but he perceives from another person it is like the goat, and it has a slight difference between these two animals i.e., the sheep has long hair along its body. Thus he perceives the unknown animal sheep through the similarity of a well known animal goat. Similarly a person, whose name is Thomas, tells his friend that his son Joseph will land at the railway station at six P.M, and he looks like himself. The friend reached the railway station and sees a person like Thomas, then he remembers the words of his friend that 'my son is like me'. Thus he understands Joseph. Here the *sādrśyanjana* and the authoritative statement of his friend helped the person to recognize Joseph at the railway station. Likewise a person who does not know the ginger, knows from another person the ginger is like the turmeric. After hearing

the words of the familiar person, the unfamiliar person knows the unknown object ginger. Thus we can understand many things through sādṛśyanjana of the well known object. From the above mentioned examples we can understand that the upamāna is a widely used means of knowledge in everyday.

The Bhāṣyakara points out how it is of great practical value in knowing the names of medicinal herbs in the Ayurveda literature. It should be remembered here that it is an efficient instrument of valid knowledge, which possesses such practical utility and effectiveness as is usually associated with validity. In this way, it would not be difficult to appreciate the reason why the Naiyāyikās regard upamāna as an independent means of valid knowledge.

Kumarilabhaṭṭa mentions the practical utility of upamāna as follows : It helps us to get the knowledge of the sacrificial details in case of a rite. The sacrificial details, viz, the

properties and appurteances not given in the "saurya sacrifice" are known as the same as mentioned in case of agneya through upamana since both of these have the common deity. "सौर्यादिवाक्यैरिहापि दृष्टम् सादृश्यताऽज्ज्ञादिभूतं कथं नु ज्ञान्यामदिदमुपमुज्यते"।

Similarly, when the vrihi kept for sacrifice are spoilt or stolen, nivara can be used as a substitute of vrihi with a view that the fruit will be the same. This is because the nivara is similar to

the vrihi. :- "जातिनिधिरपि चैवं श्रीष्टि सादृश्य-
योगाद् अवति तदप्यारं यत् जीवाश्चातौ"।

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I ORIGINAL WORKS IN SANSKRIT.

1. Kārikavali
Viswanatha Nyayapanchanana Bhattacharya, with the
commentaries
Muktavali, Dinakari, Ramarudri
Krishnadas Academy.
Varanasi – 221 001 – 1988.
2. Nyayamanjari
Of Jayanta Bhatta
Edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Gangadhara Sastri,
Tallangor.
Volume, VIII, Part I
Printed, published and sold buy
E.J. Lazarus & Co, Benares, 1895.
3. Nyayabhāṣya.
Nyāya – Bhāṣya
On
Goutama – Nyaya – Sutras
With
Prasannapada commentary
Edition
Sulami dwarikadas sastrī
Bunddha bharati
Varanasi
1998.

4. Nyāya kusumanjali
By
Uttamur.T. Viraraghavacharya
Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, series No. 31
5. Nyayavartika Talparyatika
By
Vacaspati Mishra.
Chaukambha Sanskrit Samsthan
Publishers and distributors of Oriental Cultural Literature.
P.O., Chukambha, Post Box No. 1139,
Varanasi (India)
6. Tarkasangraha
By
Annambhatta.
Chowkhamba Sanskrit series
Office
k. 37/99, gopal Mandir Lane
P.B. No. 1008 Varanasi – 221 001, India.
7. Tarkasamgraha
By Annambhatta
Test with Dipika, Sanskrit commentary
English translation, a critical introduction explanatory notes
and appendies edited by K.C. Mehendala
Publisher Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi (India)
Published – 1991.

II MODERN WORKS

1. ŚABDAPRAMĀṆA VICĀRA
Dr. T. Aryadevi
Publishers, Saparya publications
Trissur. I Edition 1997.
2. Upamana in Indian philosophy
Dr. S.K. Belvakar prize Book
Approved by The University of Poona.
Late. Dr. Shirkumar
Center of advanced study in Sanskrit, University of Poona.
Published by Eastern Book Linkers
Second revised edition. 1994.
3. Nyayakusumanjali, by Bhaswati Sinha.
(Hindu rational enquiry into the existence of God)
Interpretative exposition of udayanacarya's Auto –
commentary with transilation of Karikas. Aryan Books
international, New Delhi.
Published in – 1999.
4. A CRITICAL SURVEY OF INDIAN PHILOSOHY.
Chandradas Sharma.
Moottilal Banarasidas
Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, Madras.
5. Materials for the study of Navyanyāna logic.
Daniel. M.M. ingalls
First published – 1951.

6. Harvard Oriental series. 40
Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic.
By Daniel. H.H. Ingalls.
Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna.
Bangalore, Madras.
7. History of Indian Philosophy.
Dasguptha. (Motilal Banarasidass)
8. NAVYA NYĀYA
Some logical problems in historical perspective.
By Gopika Mohan Bhattacharya.
Bharatiya Vidya prokashan, Delhi, Varanasi.
9. Navya Nyāya system of Logic
by. D.C. Guha
Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna.
Indological publishers & Book sellers.
10. The essential of Indian philosophy.
M. Hiriyanna,
Poona Oriental Book House.
11. Outlines of Indian Philosophy
M. Hiriyanna.
(Motilal Banarasidass)
12. Relation of Epistemology.
with Ontology
(In contemporary philosophy) Vol – 1 (Review copy)
Jayendra. J. Shukla.
Kant publications, Delhi – 110 034 (India)

12. (a)History of Indian Logic
Ancient Medieval and Modern period.
Motilal Banarasidass.
Delhi, Patna, Bangalore, Madras
First edition Calcutta, 1920.
13. Gautama – The Nyāya Philosophy
N.S. Junankar
Motilal Banarasi Das
Delhi, Varanasi, Patna
First Edition Delhi, 1978.
14. Tarkabhasa
By. Kesavamisra.
Chaukhambha Orientalia
15. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies
Karl. H. Potter.
16. A primer of Indian Logic
(S. Kuppaswami Sastri)
17. Tarkakasmudi
(a manual on Nyaya – Vaisesika system
laugaksibhaskara.
Chaukhambha Amarabharti studies Vol. IX
Chaukhambha Amarabharati Prakasham, Varanasi
Oriental publishers & Foreign Book sellers
I edition 1982.
18. NYAYA PHILOSOPHY
By Mahamahopadhyaya Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa.
First published 10th April 1967.

19. The six systems of Indian Philosophy
Professor. Max Muller. K.M.
Chowkhamba Sanskrit series office, Varanasi
Printed by Vidhya Vilas press, Varanasi – 1.
20. DEFENITION OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
Dr. Nandita Bandyopadhyay.
Pramāṇalakṣaṇa in Gangesa's Tattvacinthaṃanī Vol. I
Sanskrit Puṣṭrak Bhandarkar
Calcutta – 700 006. India.
First Published August 1989.
21. Mānameyadayam
By. Nārayanaḥḥaṭṭa.
22. Indian philosophy (Volume 2)
Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.
23. Knowledge meaning and intuition]
(Some theories in Indian Logic)
Reghunath Ghosh
Edition – 2000.
24. History of Indian Logic
By. Satishchandra Vidyabhushan
25. Charaka Sammita
By. R.K. Sharma Bhavwan Dash.
Chawkhamba Sanskrit series office
26. Nyāya Theory of Perception
L.P.N. Sinha.

27. Some philosophical concepts in Purananuru.

By. P.K. Sundram.

University of Madras.

28. A study of Vaisesika philosophy.

With special reference to Vyomasivacarya.